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Few situations, if any, in our justice system grant one judge author-
ity without review over matters concerning personal liberty. Close
inspection of the juvenile justice system reveals, however, that, in real-
ity, the outcomes of nearly all juvenile delinquency cases are determined
by one individual alone, sometimes in the absence of counsel, and usu-
ally entirely outside of public view. While there is widespread recogni-
tion that appellate practice on behalf of juveniles is lacking, there is little
quantitative data available to define the scope of the problem. Aside
from ensuring accuracy, the lack of appeals hampers the ability of appel-
late courts to define the contours of criminal law and procedure in its
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application to juveniles, one of its core appellate functions. The dearth
of appellate practice also intersects with the struggles of the juvenile
justice system to overcome disparate results for minority children,
including confinement. This article provides original empirical data
identifying the rate of appeals in fifteen states. The data from the study
grounds the discussion about juvenile appeals and informs efforts
toward improvements. The article also examines the ways in which this
limited appellate practice restricts law development by analyzing appel-
late case law in juvenile justice over the past ten years.
Public recognition of the institutional role of appellate courts has
increased, due in part to cases and studies examining post-conviction
determinations of actual innocence-including innocent children. Those
findings have resonated with the public and raised important policy and
structural questions about the justice system. This renewed attention cre-
ates an opportunity to improve and highlight the role of the appellate
function in the juvenile justice system as well. Appellate courts in the
criminal justice system protect against error and define the rights of the
accused, increasing accuracy, public accountability, and transparency.
The article examines the repercussions in an area of law where the
appellate role and transparency to the public is overwhelmingly absent
and calls for states to take a more active role in effectively realizing the
right to appeal among juveniles.
INTRODUCTION
"There are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in which a
single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters concern-
ing a person's liberty or property .... "I
Despite the existence of a right to appeal juvenile delinquency
cases in all states, the outcome is nearly always left to a single judge.
Although the discretion of judges in juvenile delinquency cases is not
"unreviewable," in practical terms, juvenile delinquency cases are rarely
subject to appellate review.
Imagine, for example, the situation of Joan, a fifteen-year-old Afri-
can-American high school student living in a low-income neighborhood.
Joan has had no prior contact with law enforcement. Joan and her friend
were at a park on the property of the neighborhood high school at 11:30
p.m., a local nighttime hangout where groups of youths congregated.
Joan sat on a park bench with her friend as her friend smoked a ciga-
1. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.l (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan
continued, "and the reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts,
while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their
right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.").
[Vol. 66:671672
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rette. A few groups of other teens were nearby on the basketball court,
including Joan's brother, who put some of his possessions in her bag at
one point when he went to the court to play basketball. A fight broke out
and a number of police officers responded. As Joan and her friend rose
to leave, two officers approached the area where they had been seated.
The officers asked them to come toward two police cruisers parked
nearby where at least two other officers were present. Having observed
Joan's friend throw down her cigarette, one of the police officers
inquired what Joan's friend had been smoking. He then asked Joan if he
could open the bag she was holding. She shrugged her shoulders, moved
the strap of her bag from her shoulder into her hand, and held it forward
toward one officer. She did not, however, give a verbal answer. The
officer reached forward, opened the bag, and discovered a weapon. Joan
was arrested and charged with felony possession of a weapon on school
property.2 Joan did not know that the knife, which belonged to her older
brother, was in the bag. Joan's brother had placed the weapon inside
with keys and a few other items before playing basketball. He fled from
the park when the fight broke out.
Joan appeared in court with her older sister, age seventeen, who
accompanied her because her mother could not miss work. Joan waived
her right to appear with counsel.' She then pled, confused about the
process, and later received one year of probation. As a result of her
adjudication for a felony in her jurisdiction, Joan's DNA will be
included in the state DNA registry under the statute requiring registra-
tion of felons, which includes juvenile adjudications. 4 She also will be
eligible for enhanced adult sentencing if she is convicted later as an
adult.'
Age and previous experience with law enforcement are permissible
factors for consideration under the totality of the circumstances analysis
that applies in the court's analysis of consent to search.6 In Joan's juris-
2. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.122(E)(1) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-217b(a) (West 2001).
3. Waiver of counsel is common in juvenile courts across the country. See, e.g., PATRICIA
PURIrZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS V (2006),
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf ("Observers were often troubled
by Florida's high rates of waiver of counsel . . . ."). Puritz writes that young children are observed
routinely waiving counsel, which often occurs "with a wink and a nod-or even encouragement-
from judges." Id. at 2. Many states do not require the presence of a parent or guardian for a valid
waiver. See infra Part II.B.L
4. See infra note 216 and accompanying text (describing DNA collection from juveniles).
5. See infra Part II.C.1 and accompanying notes 194-213 (discussing the use of juvenile
adjudications as sentencing enhancements).
6. See, e.g., In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 504 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (remanding on the issue of
consent to a search by a fourteen-year-old and requiring the trial judge to "deal expressly and
6732012]
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diction, age and previous experience with law enforcement have not
been explored nor applied in great detail in existing case law. Case law
exists, however, to support suppression of the item found in the search
of Joan's bag.7 At trial, it also would have been necessary to show that
Joan knowingly possessed the weapon.' But none of the issues in Joan's
case were litigated, and, therefore, will never be discussed on appeal.
Six months later, Joan, whose picture was then included in the
juvenile photo book at the precinct after her first arrest, was identified
by another teenager in a photo array as having committed a robbery with
a knife in the neighborhood. This time, Joan did not waive her right to
counsel and the case went to trial. Joan claimed she was innocent but the
eyewitness insisted that Joan was the perpetrator. The same judge who
handled Joan's prior case presided over her robbery trial. The judge also
had a report from probation that Joan's compliance was mediocre. The
probation report stated that Joan was hanging around with "gang-
involved" youth, a term the office uses when a child reports that he or
she knows people in gangs. At trial, Joan lost, despite conflicting testi-
mony by the minor who identified her in the photo array and the actual
victim, who was unable to identify Joan. Joan was eventually ordered to
confinement in a juvenile facility. Joan's attorney, strapped with a
caseload above the recommended norm,' had received little appellate
training, so Joan's case was not appealed. Joan now has two felony juve-
nile adjudications on her record, adjudications which contain serious
questions about their reliability and accuracy.
thoroughly with the significance of age before finding that a juvenile has consented to a search");
E.J. v. State, 40 So. 3d 922, 923-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (remanding where the court found
lack of consent to a search, and holding that whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of the circumstances, one of which is the age of the defendant).
7. See In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 503 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (remanding trial court decision
and instructing the trial court to consider the fourteen-year-old defendant's age when determining
whether the defendant consented to a search); In re Daijah D., 927 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343-44 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2011) (reversing and dismissing petition where trial court incorrectly ruled that
fourteen-year-old girl voluntarily consented to search of her purse when she was stopped and
confronted by four police officers and handed an officer her purse upon request). In Daijah, the
court noted that age and prior experience with the law were necessary factors for the court to
consider. 927 N.Y.S.2d at 343; see also E.J., 40 So. 3d at 924 (holding that conduct by a fourteen-
year-old with no prior experience with law enforcement who placed her hands on top of the car
and stood with her legs apart "[did] not yield the conclusion that she consented but merely
acquiesced to the authority around her and what she expected was required in the circumstances").
8. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.122(B) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-217b(a) (West 2001).
9. See ABA, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES
OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1, 5 n. 19 (2002), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/
tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf (endorsing the caseload maximums issued by the National Advisory
Commission recommending that an attorney be assigned no more than 200 juvenile delinquency
cases, 150 felony cases, 400 misdemeanor cases, 200 civil commitment proceedings, or twenty-
five appeals in one year).
674 [Vol. 66:671
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While Joan's cases are hypothetical, the facts used are not uncom-
mon. The lack of appeals in juvenile practice has been identified as a
problem throughout the country by the ABA, scholars, and practition-
ers.'o Without a vibrant appellate practice, the legal rights of juveniles
suffer and "are often illusory."" Not surprisingly, juvenile courts were
recently explored as a probable "breeding ground" for wrongful convic-
tions.12 Moreover, the juvenile delinquency process often remains hid-
den from any form of public participation due to closed courtrooms in
many states, coupled with the lack of right to a jury trial, making appeals
one of the only avenues of transparency.13 Even in the adult criminal
context, which remains open to the public, when other public character-
istics of the appellate process are curtailed, such as production of written
opinions and oral argument, Professor Paul Carrington plainly states,
"[w]e should worry about that."" When appeals are simply absent, the
implications multiply.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to a criminal appeal is
not a constitutional right," but appeals are so ingrained in our concept
of justice that every state provides the right to file an appeal for both
adult and juvenile defendants. 6 Criminal defendants are generally
viewed as being able to pursue appeals with frequency.' 7 In contrast,
10. The ABA stated that "[an alarming aspect of juvenile defense is the infrequency with
which appeals are taken." PATRICIA PURrlz ET AL., NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. ET AL., A
CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 10 (1995), available at http:www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf
[hereinafter 1995 ABA REPORT]. The report was initially authored by the ABA Juvenile Justice
Center, which later became the National Juvenile Defender Center. See also Joshua A. Tepfer,
Laura H. Nirider & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 898 (2010) (noting that juvenile court defendants rarely make use of
appeals).
11. Gary L. Crippen, Can the Courts Fairly Account for the Diminished Competence and
Culpability of Juveniles? A Judge's Perspective, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 403, 411, 414 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds.,
2000) (stating that children's legal rights are "often illusory" without a healthy appellate practice).
12. See generally Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground
for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 257, 321 (2007); Tepfer, Nirider & Tricarico, supra
note 10, at 898.
13. See infra Part fl B.2 (describing the various approaches by many states that have closed
courtrooms under different circumstances for juvenile cases).
14. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century
Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 459, 469 (2009). Carrington writes that the absence of public
proceedings as part of the appellate process, such as oral argument and written opinions, leaves
the public without knowledge of the error correction process. Id. In the juvenile context, the cause
for worry would, by that measure, increase quite significantly.
15. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("A review by an appellate court of the
final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted,
was not at common law and is not now, a necessary element of due process.").
16. See infra Section I. A. (describing the right to appeal).
17. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
6752012]
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there is widespread acknowledgement that appeals in the juvenile delin-
quency context are lacking, even "nearly non-existent."'" But there is no
recent empirical data measuring the infrequency and little exploration of
the systemic implications. There is only one published study post-
Gaultl9 containing quantitative juvenile appellate statistical case data;
that study includes information for one state during one calendar year,
1990.20
The Supreme Court has issued three landmark decisions "that pro-
foundly alter the status and treatment of children in the justice system"
in just six years. 2 1 Notably, two of the cases arose where children were
tried outside of the juvenile court as adults.22 The ability of the justice
system to implement and apply the reasoning supporting those opinions
depends, in many ways, on the juvenile appeals process, which is infre-
quent at best. While there is some consideration in the literature about
why there are few appeals, 23 there is little analysis about how the dearth
PROCEDURE § 1.3(r) (4th ed. 2004) ("[In some jurisdictions, as many as 90% of the defendants
who were convicted after trial and sentenced to prison will appeal their convictions."); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 96-97 (1996) (discussing
the increased appeals resulting from increased access to counsel by indigent defendants after
1960, particularly after 1983). Posner concluded, "[gliven a free lawyer, the cost of appealing falls
to zero, and the defendant will have no reason not to appeal even if the chances of winning are
slight-as they are." Id. at 118; see also Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts,
and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REv. 437, 470 (2004) (discussing the prevalence
of criminal appeals).
18. See ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE & KIM BROOKS TANDY, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER
CTR. ET AL., INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGs 38 (2006), available at http://www.
njdc.info/pdflIndiana%2OAssessment.pdf ("Appellate practice by local trial offices is nearly non-
existent, and the process by which appeals are handled is unclear."); see also 1995 ABA REPORT,
supra note 10, at 10.
19. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the Right to
Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 233-35 tbl.2
(1994).
21. Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme Court Heralds the
Emergence of the 'Reasonable Juvenile' in American Criminal Law, 89 CRIM. L. REP. 753, 753
(2011). The three cases are Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005), and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
22. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557
(2005).
23. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 20, at 217-18. Additionally, the 1995 ABA Report, along
with the subsequent series of state assessments performed by the ABA, and, later, the National
Juvenile Defender Center, discuss the reasons posited about why appeals are lacking. See, e.g.,
KEHOE & TANDY, supra note 18, at 38. As a whole, the institutional role of the appellate courts in
the criminal context receives a "relative lack of scholarly attention" as compared to civil cases. Cf
Chad M. Oldfather & Michael M. O'Hear, Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 339, 339 (2009) (citing the relative lack of scholarly attention as a primary
impetus for a recent conference at Marquette University Law School "to examine enduring and
emerging issues relating to the exercise of the appellate function in criminal cases"); see also
Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 825,
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of appellate process hampers the development of the application of crim-
inal procedural law to juveniles, both procedurally and substantively.
This article focuses specifically on juvenile delinquency appeals.
Overall, the discussion examines the effects of the absence of appellate
practice on the core appellate court functions: error correction, law-mak-
ing, and uniformity. It includes recent original data that measures the
rate of appeals in fourteen states. It also examines the written appellate
opinions available online via Westlaw nationally over a ten year period
in order to explore the possible broader effects on the development of
the law.
Part I discusses the right to criminal and juvenile appeals and the
legal and historical development of this right. It also reviews the limited
research and data available about delinquency appeals and discusses fac-
tors that contribute to the current dearth of delinquency appellate prac-
tice. Part II explores aspects of juvenile practice that distinguish it from
criminal cases and characteristics, such as collateral consequences, that
are similarly punitive. Part II also examines the absence of appeals as a
missed opportunity to address disproportionate minority confinement in
the juvenile justice system.
Part III provides empirical data collected from states, revealing the
rates of juvenile appeals. Because judicial opinions play a central role in
the development of the law, Part IV then analyzes written appellate juve-
nile delinquency opinions available via Westlaw's database. It isolates
opinions that discuss Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges and chal-
lenges to juvenile dispositions.
Part V examines the role of appeals going forward and suggests
that states assess the access of the right to appeal by juveniles. Curtail-
ment of the appellate right puts defendants at risk of erroneous convic-
tions.2 4 "Appellate courts, through their decisions of cases and the
explanations for their decisions, declare, make, and reshape legal doc-
trine in common-law, statutory, and constitutional fields."2 If that is not
happening at this critical phase of the justice system, what is the impact
on rights of juveniles, and what is the communal cost? Judicial engage-
ment with questions in criminal justice can deter unlawful police con-
duct, promote better law enforcement and training, and influence the
826 (2009) (discussing lack of attention to criminal appeals and why criminal appeals in particular
warrant more scholarly attention).
24. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Marc M.
Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 514
(1992).
25. DANIEL JoHN MEADOR & JORDANNA SmioNE BERNSTIEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (1994).
6772012]
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integrity of judicial proceedings.2 6 It is also the mechanism by which
state courts develop rights under individual state constitutions, an area
where criminal procedural law has been a "driving force."27
I. APPELLATE HISTORY AND PROCESS
A. Right to Criminal Appeals
Appellate review is not a constitutional right under the U.S. Consti-
tution.28 It is, however, recognized as a cornerstone of the justice sys-
tem, particularly in the criminal context.29 Sixteen states provide a
constitutional right to a criminal appeal,30 and others extend the right by
statute.1 In a unanimous decision in 1894, the Supreme Court stated
that there is no constitutional right to a criminal appeal.3 2 In 1983, the
Court again reiterated in dicta in Jones v. Barnes that "[t]here is, of
course, no constitutional right to an appeal . ..'3 That conclusion was
not left without challenge in that instance. Justice Brennan remarked that
it was, in fact, "arguably wrong."34 Despite this disagreement, however,
the Court has ruled consistently with this view since the time it was first
announced.3 ' Nevertheless, all states extend the right to file a criminal
26. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment
on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 237, 256
("Governments employ about 870,000 law enforcement officers in the United States, and the
Fourth Amendment regulates them together with many other government actors."); cf Arthur L.
Burnett, Sr., An Irony: Greater Protection of Individual Rights Now Found in State Courts, CRIM.
JusT., Spring 2007, at 20, 27 (explaining that a more robust invocation of state constitutional
rights in state courts to develop criminal procedure has effects beyond the rights of the accused).
27. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSUTUIONs 125 (2009).
28. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
29. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("Appellate review has now become an
integral part of the .. . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant."); see
also Arkin, supra note 24, at 578 ("It is difficult to think of another procedural institution of such
enormous practical significance that exists wholly outside the constitutional aegis."); Heise, supra
note 23, at 825 ("[F]ew dispute the appellate process's centrality to justice systems, especially in
the criminal context. . . ."); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 379 (1995) ('The appeals process ... is a widely observed feature of
litigation.").
30. Arkin, supra note 24, at 516 n.64 (citing fifteen state constitutional provisions and, where
relevant, court interpretations finding a right to appeal). These states include Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio,
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. In addition, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides a right
to appeal that has been interpreted to include criminal and juvenile delinquency cases. PA. CONST.
art. V, § 9 (as interpreted by In re A.P., 617 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("All of the States now provide some
method of appeal from criminal convictions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a
correct adjudication of guilt or innocence.").
32. McKane, 153 U.S. at 687.
33. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
34. Id. at 756 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Arkin, supra note 24, at 506-07; see also Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir.
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appeal, with almost all states providing one appeal as a matter of right.3 6
Even though there is no federal constitutional right to appeal, once
a state grants the right to appeal, it must provide counsel for indigent
defendants in a first appeal, so as not to discriminate against the indigent
on equal protection grounds. Some states extend this right beyond the
first appeal, providing representation at the post-conviction phase and
beyond. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the
right to counsel extends all the way through appeals taken from revoca-
tion hearings.38 Similarly, Pennsylvania courts determined that the right
to counsel under state law attaches at the time of arrest, before criminal
proceedings have been initiated by an indictment or arraignment." In
doing so, many state courts provide broader protections for access to
counsel than is required under the U.S. Constitution.4 0
Appellate process serves three essential functions: correction of
legal error in the initial proceedings, the opportunity for "law-making"
to develop and refine the law, and uniformity in the law's application.4 1
In the criminal context particularly, the third function is critical to ensure
uniform treatment and consistent practices.42 Appellate courts provide
1992). In Billotti, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision that the lack of an automatic right to a
criminal appeal in West Virginia was not a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
36. Arkin, supra note 24, at 513-514 (discussing the right to appeal, noting that Virginia,
West Virginia, and New Hampshire do not provide the right to appellate review in criminal cases,
rather review was discretionary). More recently, West Virginia amended its appellate process so
that the court must issue a decision explaining its denial of review, altering its discretionary
review system slightly. See W.V. R. App. P. 5 (effective December 1, 2010); see also Jack
Rogers, Commentary, West Virginia Needs an Appellate Court Now, CHARLESTON DAILY MAL,
Feb. 4, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.dailymail.com/Opinion/Commentary/201102031423
(describing the recent change in West Virginia).
37. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (concluding that lack of counsel would amount to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause)).
38. Bronson v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 421 A.2d 1021, 1025-26 (Pa. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Karash, 518 A.2d 537, 541 (Pa. 1986).
40. Compare United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial proceedings), with, e.g.,
Bronson v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 421 A.2d 1021, 1025-26 (Pa. 1980) (holding that, under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the right to counsel extends through appeals and revocation hearing).
41. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE
COURTS: ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURT OFINIONS IN LAW DEVELOPMENT 1, 142 (2010),
available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/Appellate&
CISOPTR= 195; Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 316
(2009); Randall T. Shepard, Essay, Changing the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Indiana
Supreme Court: Letting a Court of Last Resort Act Like One, 63 IND. L.J. 669, 669 (1988) (As
former Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Judge Shepard writes, "the law-giving
function is pivotal.").
42. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 21-1.2(b) (2d ed. 1980), available at http:/l
www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice section-archive/crimjust-standards_crimapp
eals blk.html [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS].
6792012]
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"psychological cover" in that "an appellate court's correction of an error
in any given case tends to foster an environment in which fewer errors
are committed in the first instance."4 3 With this theory in mind, areas of
the law that are underrepresented in appellate practice and lack pub-
lished opinions suffer." Beyond error correction, appellate review and
published opinions play a critical role in the public's understanding and
perception of the legal system.4 5 Opinions also provide guidance and
uniformity to lower courts. Specific to criminal law, the "law giving"
function and appellate development of the law also provide guidance
and boundaries for police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.46
Although the quality of indigent defense suffers overall,4 7 the
access to appeal for adult defendants is not generally called into question
in the way that it is for juveniles.48 The largest study documenting the
rate of criminal appeals taken found that 16% of federal convictions
were appealed.49 At the state level, estimates are higher, but little data is
available.o Most appeals are filed by the defendant." In addition, the
study of federal appeals found that two-thirds of those appeals were filed
by defendants who had pled guilty.5 2 The federal government has
recently recognized the importance of a greater working knowledge of
state criminal appellate systems. Therefore, it has sought to expand the
availability of state court appellate data by funding a study that will
43. Oldfather, supra note 41, at 317; see, e.g., Richard L. Pemberton & Paul S. Almen,
Significant Weight: The Impact of the Minnesota Court of Appeals upon Civil Litigation, 35 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1297, 1309 (2009) (discussing the effect of intermediate appellate courts
twenty-five years after installation in Minnesota and discussing recognition that "district court
judges are more cognizant of the possibility of remand and reversal and as a result have issued
better-reasoned decisions").
44. Cf. FLANGo, supra note 41, at 142 ("The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests largely on
the responsibility of judges to explain and justify their decisions in opinions that can be publicly
read, analyzed and criticized.") (internal citation omitted ).
45. Heise, supra note 23, at 827.
46. David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal
Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 519 (1990).
47. See, e.g., Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon's Broken Promise by Viewing
Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421-22
(2012); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006); Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act:
A Congressional Solution to the Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 487, 488
(2010).
48. See supra Introduction (discussing access to appeals in general).
49. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTics, NCJ 185055, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
APPEALS, 1999 wir TRENDS 1985-99 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
asciilfca99.txt [hereinafter 2001 DOJ REPORT].
50. See Arkin, supra note 24, at 514; supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing
prevalence of appeals); supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing lack of data for state
appeals).




examine cases litigated in 2010."
Yet, even with more robust appellate system at work for adults than
juveniles and higher levels of transparency, grave injustices occur.5 4
Indeed, the importance of the error-correcting function of appellate
courts is illuminated by wrongful convictions."5 These examples high-
light the role of appellate courts, a role that some argue needs expansion
and modification in order to properly protect against wrongful convic-
tions.56 This raises concerns about the juvenile delinquency context,
where appeals are filed infrequently.
B. Right to Juvenile Appeals
The first juvenile court, which originated in 1899 in Chicago,
allowed appeals. Other states subsequently adopted similar models of
juvenile courts.58 As support for the rehabilitative underpinnings of the
juvenile court grew, however, access to appeals changed. By 1933, eight
states' juvenile courts did not make provisions for appeal or rehearing."
The failure to include a provision for appeals reflected the early philo-
sophical beliefs that the judge's central task in juvenile court was to
"fix" the child with "care and solicitude[,]" 60 rather than determine guilt
or innocence.
53. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OMB No. 1121-0329, 2010
SURVEY OF STATE COURT CRIMINAL APPEALS SOLICITATION (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ssccal0sol.pdf [hereinafter 2010 DOJ REPORT]. The request for
proposals focused "on criminal appeals disposed in calendar year 2010 and aims to obtain
information on certain key case characteristics, including the types of criminal cases appealed to
state intermediate appellate courts and courts of last resort, in addition to the disposition of
criminal appeals, appellate case processing time, and the impact of appellate litigation on trial
court outcomes." Id. at 3.
54. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 94-115
(2008) (discussing an examination of 200 post-conviction DNA cases where the defendants were
exonerated after being convicted of rape or murders).
55. Id.
56. See generally Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ.
L. REV. 591, 591-92 (2009) (describing appellate failure to reverse or detect wrongful
convictions, the sources of appellate failure, and presenting proposals for an improved criminal,
appellate system).
57. Benedict S. Alper, Juvenile Justice: A Study of Juvenile Appeals to the Suffolk Superior
Court, Boston, 1930-1935, 28 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 340, 340 (1937).
58. Id.
59. In 1933, eight states did not provide the right for juveniles to appeal. Alper, supra note
57, at 340 (citing FRANCIS HILLER, N.Y. PROB. Ass'N, JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1933)).
60. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV.
L. REv. 104, 120 (1909)).
61. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 60, at 119-20 ("The problem for determination by the judge is
not, ['Hias this boy or girl committed a specific wrong[?'], but ['W]hat is he, how has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career[?]").
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Even though some states formed juvenile courts without granting
access to appeals, others continued to afford the right. A 1937 study by
Benedict Alper in Boston demonstrated that juvenile appeals occurred
with relative frequency between 1930 and 1935 in that jurisdiction.6 2
Indeed, Alper found that more than one-third of orders committing
juveniles to a detention facility were appealed during the five-year
period.63 Even more dramatic, nine of ten of those orders were
reversed.' The commentary about juvenile courts at the time suggests
that this kind of finding was rare, and, thus, surprising. Comments at the
time noted unbridled judicial power observed in juvenile courts and lim-
ited appeals. 65 Still, the contrast to the way in which appellate practice
has developed is startling in comparison to Alper's early study.
By the time the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Gault
thirty years later, counsel was commonly absent in juvenile court,6 6 and
appeals were rare. Indeed, Gerald Gault did not have a right to direct
appeal under Arizona law and a habeas petition was his only recourse
for relief.67 After Gault, most believed that the Court's emphasis on the
child's right to counsel "at every step in the proceedings against him"68
and judicial discretion to order transcripts would improve access to
counsel and appellate practice. That belief and aspiration, however,
stands in stark contrast to the current status of appeals in juvenile
practice.
The Supreme Court did not separately address whether juveniles
have the right to an appeal when it decided Gault.6 9 The Court, there-
fore, was silent about the application of its prior reasoning regarding the
right to criminal appeals. All states, however, provide juveniles with the
62. Alper, supra note 57, at 344.
63. Id. Out of 628 orders to commit juveniles to detention facilities, 216 were appealed. Id.
64. Alper, supra note 57, at 361 (noting that a lower court judge is bound "to be rendered
more cautious in his use of commitment orders when he learns that nine-tenths of these appeals
are successful").
65. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 (citing Roscoe Pound, Foreword to PAULINE YOUNG, SOCIAL
TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xxvii (1937)).
66. See id at 37-38 n.63 (stating that while a third of the states allowed for representation by
counsel in juvenile proceedings, only a few state statutes required "advice of the right to counsel
and to have counsel appointed"). For example, some statutes allowed for appointment on request
or at the discretion of the court. Id.; see also TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY & YOUTH CRIME 82 (1967) (stating that, out of a survey of 207 juvenile
courts serving populations of at least 100,000, a lawyer appeared for less than 10% of juveniles at
most courts).
67. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1967).
68. Id. at 36.
69. See id. at 58 ("[W]e need not rule [on the right to appeal] in the present case . . . ."). The
Gault Court noted that the child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him[,]" but declined to address the right to counsel for appeals. Id. at 36.
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right to appeal-at least in theory-just as they do for adults.o States
primarily extend this right by statute and in some cases, the state consti-
tutional right has been interpreted to apply to juveniles. Interestingly,
in Pennsylvania, the locus of the one recent quantitative case study doc-
umenting the infrequency of appeals, an appeal is a juvenile's constitu-
tional right."
The six states without statutes addressing juvenile appeals still rec-
ognize the juvenile right to appeal through the common law. In addition,
appellate courts have held that where the criminal right to appeal is
granted by the state, the Equal Protection Clause requires the right to be
extended to juveniles.7 3 Courts have also specifically held that, under
Douglas v. California,74 the right to counsel on appeal for indigent
defendants must also extend to juveniles. Some states grant the right to
70. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 802-03 n.167 (2010)
(listing state statutes enumerating juvenile appellate right to appeal in forty-four states). For state
statutes that enumerate juvenile appellate rights and answer survey data in Part II, see ALA. CODE
§ 12-15-601 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.534 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-3 (West
2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419A.200(1) (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-52(a) (1981);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.033 (West 1990).
The states without statutes specifically referencing juvenile appeals are Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and South Dakota. Fedders, supra, at 802-03, n.167. In states where
the right to appeal is extended in criminal cases, however, at least one court and scholars have
concluded that the right must also be provided to juveniles pursuant to equal protection. See
Gilliam v. State, 808 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Ark. 1991); see also RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN GUGGENHEIM
& ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ArrORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT
§ 39.02, at 723 (2008).
71. The Pennsylvania constitutional provision addressing appeals has been interpreted to
include criminal and juvenile cases. See In re A.P., 617 A.2d 764, 766-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(interpreting PA. CONST. art. V, § 9); see also UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (providing an appeal of
right in all cases except for matters filed originally with the state supreme court).
72. PA CONST. art. V, § 9.
73. See State v. Berlat, 707 P.2d 303, 307 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); Gilliam, 808 S.W.2d at 740;
People v. Kevin S. (In re Kevin S.), 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 183 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also
HERTZ, GUGGENHEIM & AMSTERDAM, supra note 70, at 723.
74. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
75. See Berlat, 707 P.2d at 307; Gilliam, 808 S.W.2d at 740; Kevin S., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197
(holding that juveniles have a right to counsel on appeal in California under Douglas and that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the minor's one and only appeal as of right be full and
effective"); State v. Hairston, 946 P.2d 397, 400 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (acknowledging the
juvenile right to counsel on appeal by applying procedures required under Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), to counsel for juvenile). In State v. Hairston, the court recognized that just as
in adult proceedings, appellate counsel must obtain permission from the court to withdraw as
counsel where he or she believes there is no good faith basis for appeal. See Hairston, 946 P.2d at
537-38. For decisions in federal court, see John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 1992)
(observing that the "independent constitutional right to counsel for juvenile appeals" is grounded
in the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel); United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016, 1018 (1st
Cir. 1991) (relying on Sixth Amendment cases in the adult context for its finding that "[i]f a
juvenile has a right to counsel, and a right to appeal, she must also have the right to counsel on her
first direct appeal" (citing Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1988); Douglas, 372 U.S. at
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an attorney on appeal either expressly in the statute or as interpreted by
the court. 6 In at least one state, Pennsylvania, once counsel is assigned,
the state requires attorneys to continue representation for juveniles
through appeal until a final judgment is ordered." Although, in practice,
it is not clear how well this statute is implemented, particularly when
youth are encouraged to waive the right to counsel.
After direct appeal, post-conviction relief is not widely available to
juveniles. 79 Therefore, after the time to file an appeal has expired or
direct appeal has failed, a problem with or challenge to a juvenile adju-
dication may have no obvious remedy. This problem was clearly illus-
trated in an example from Pennsylvania80 and other places receiving less
attention, like Illinois.8 ' Additionally, juveniles in some instances are
precluded from raising habeas challenges, even in the face of lengthy
sentences. 82
355-56)); Reed v. Duter, 416 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1969) ("Gault must be construed as
incorporating in juvenile court procedures, which may lead to deprivation of liberty . . . the
constitutional safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments .... ").
76. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.133 (West 2007) (as interpreted by Chambers v. Dist.
Court, 152 N.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Iowa 1967)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3404 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (West 2009); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-6-233 (West 2004); TENN. R. Juv. P. 36.
77. PA. R. Juv. CT. P. 150(B) (requiring that counsel shall represent the juvenile until final
judgment, including in any proceeding upon direct appeal).
78. See infra notes 148-153 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial scandal in
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania and juvenile waiver of counsel).
79. See, e.g., People v. A. W. H. (In re A. W. H.), 420 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981); People v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 396 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); J.A. v. State,
904 N.E.2d 250, 254 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), transfer denied, 915 N.E.2d 993 (Ind. 2009)
(stating that "post-conviction procedures are not available to challenge a juvenile delinquency
adjudication . . . ." (citing Perkins v. State, 718 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))). But see
State ex rel. D.W., 47 So. 3d 1048, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (advising juvenile of right to post-
conviction relief pursuant to applicable state statute).
80. JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY: PROMOTING FAIRNESS,
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILIFY iv (2010), available at http://www.jlc.org/sites/default/
files/press-release pdfsluzerne exec summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY].
81. See People v. Jonathon C.B. (In re Jonathon C.B.), 958 N.E.2d 227, 264 (Ill. 2011)
(Burke, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of remedy for a juvenile challenging the use of
shackles during his trial and noting that an adult would have a remedy in the same situation under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act). The dissent in Jonathan C.B. argued that "the majority, while
maintaining that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature and are more protective of the
rights of juveniles, actually places juveniles in a worse position, providing them with less
protection than an adult." Id.
82. See, e.g., Ex parte Valle, 104 S.W.3d 888, 889-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that
article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governing applications for writs of habeas
corpus may not be used to challenge a juvenile's imprisonment because adjudication of
delinquency for committing capital murder is not a felony conviction); see also In re R.J.M., 211
S.W.3d 393, 394-95 & n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that there is no legislative authority
allowing a juvenile to appeal a motion denying him access to counsel to seek post-conviction
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After a judicial scandal came to light in 2008 in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania, experts there examined the current system and noted that
there are traditionally few appeals of adjudications and no appeals of
dispositions.13 Even as information about the unlawful acts of two
judges who had sent scores of children to confinement in exchange for
payment was revealed, there was no available appellate remedy due to
the lack of post-conviction relief available for juveniles.8 4 The only rem-
edy available to the petitioners was to file a King's Bench petition with
the state supreme court." While this example is extreme, Pennsylvania
is certainly not the only state suffering from deficient access to appeals
and post-conviction relief for juveniles. In a system with no appeals,
states place juveniles at risk with the inherent lack of accountability.
C. What Is Known About Juvenile Appeals
The appellate process acts as a check on abuse of power and misap-
plication of the law and is particularly important in juvenile court." Yet,
there is universal agreement that this process is lacking, even astonish-
ingly so, in juvenile practice." When the issue is raised, scholars and
policy makers have limited access to statistical data to define the scope
of the problem. This leads to common attribution to few sources, only
one of which contains statistical case data.
In 1937, the author of an empirical case study of juvenile delin-
quency appeals in the Boston area lamented that the "literature gives
scant attention to [the appellate] phase of the juvenile court problem."8
After Gault was decided in 1967, many believed the provision of coun-
sel would provide more opportunity for appellate practice and would
lead to increased discussion. 8 9 But in 1994, the author of the next empir-
ical study addressing juvenile delinquency appeals, which appears to be
the only other quantitative juvenile delinquency appellate study other
than Alper's early study, echoed the previous author's lament.90 He
noted-understandably unaware of Alper's study, already over half a
century old at that time-that the subject of juvenile appeals had not
DNA testing and analogizing the basis of the reasoning to the lack of specific grant of access to
habeas proceedings for juveniles).
83. See LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY, supra note 80, at 16.
84. See id. at 18.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 16-17.
87. See generally 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10.
88. Alper, supra note 57, at 342.
89. Mary Beth Ortbals, Comment, Appellate Review of Juvenile Court Proceedings and the
Role of the Attorney, 13 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 90, 105 (1968).
90. Harris, supra note 20, at 209.
2012] 685
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
been the subject of quantitative research in any U.S. jurisdiction.91 By
any standard, that inattention continues.
The quantitative study by Donald Harris includes case statistics
from Pennsylvania published in 1994, and scholars cite it frequently
when referencing appeals.92 Using statewide data from 1990, the study
is limited to cases where the child was committed to a detention facility
at the original disposition.93 It found that an average of one appeal
existed per 100 juvenile cases resulting in detention.94 It compared the
rate of juvenile appeals and adult criminal appeals where defendants
were committed to a prison or detention facility and found a dramatic
difference: Adult appeals were filed in eleven times more cases, 1% for
juveniles and 11% for adults.95 Next, scholars commonly reference the
1995 ABA Juvenile Justice Center Report and its results of a survey to
public defenders and panel attorneys inquiring about the numbers of
appeals taken in juvenile cases. 96 The survey revealed that the use of
appeals in juvenile practice was rare: A third of the offices reported that
they were "not authorized" to take appeals, and nearly half of the offices
that were authorized had not taken an appeal in the prior year. 9 7 It is
unclear what source of authorization-whether external funding or inter-
nal policies-precluded appellate practice, as it is arguably an equal pro-
tection violation if states do not provide juveniles with counsel on
appeal. 98 The numerous state assessments performed by the National
91. Id. at 210.
92. Id. at 220. For examples of literature referring to Harris's data to support the proposition
that there are so few juvenile appeals, see, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 12, at 294 n.312;
Fedders, supra note 70, at 812 n.215; Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in
Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 189, 220 n. 185 (2007); Richard E.
Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Is it Sound Policy?, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 231, 243-44 (2002).
93. Harris, supra note 20, at 220. The study tracked each case independently from start to
conclusion.
94. Harris, supra note 20, at 220.
95. Id. at 233 tbl. 2.
96. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 10; see, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of
Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 633 (2002) (citing to
another source discussing the lack of appeals found in the ABA Report); Fedders, supra note 70,
at 812; David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues
Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503,
564-65 (2006); Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth
Continue to Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 543, 567 (2009); Donna Sheen, Professional Responsibilities Toward Children in Trouble
with the Law, 5 Wyo. L. REv. 483, 505 (2005) (citing the alarming lack of appeals in juvenile
practice, which originates from the 1995 study).
97. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing results of a survey of public
defenders that revealed that 32% of their offices are not authorized to handle appeals and of those
that do handle them, 46% took no appeals in the prior year).
98. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Juvenile Defender Center also include comprehensive information
resulting from in-depth interviews in the field.9 9 These reports, in turn,
also provide support for conclusions about the lack of juvenile appellate
practice and infrastructure across states. 00 Case statistical data is not the
focus of these reports, however, and therefore, such data complements
these findings to create a more complete picture.
The data in Harris's Pennsylvania study documenting the specific
percentages of cases appealed in confinement cases only is now over
two decades old. In addition, the nature of juvenile justice has changed
during the two decades since that time. The collateral consequences that
now attach to juvenile adjudications have increased substantially since
1990, elevating the stakes of the case outcomes. 01 Today, adjudications
will remain a part of a person's life in increasing ways.10 2 Along with
basic liberty interests and risks of confinement, these statutory changes
create a heightened need to ensure that juvenile adjudications are relia-
ble findings. For example, juvenile adjudications and criminal convic-
tions are treated the same under certain provisions of the Federal Armed
Career Criminals Act and similar state statutory schemes. 0 3 Courts have
upheld this practice based on the reasoning that juvenile adjudications
are reliable.104 Arguably, the lack of appeals diminishes this reliability
99. The individual state assessments performed by the ABA Juvenile Justice Center, and
later, the National Juvenile Defender Center, as an outgrowth of the 1995 ABA Report, are
commonly cited for insightful descriptive results from interviews with juvenile defenders and
juveniles addressing appellate practice. For examples of reports, see generally LAVAL S. MILLER-
WILSON, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003),
available at http://www.jlc.org/sites/default/files/publication-pdfs/PA%2Assesment%200f%20
Access%20to%20Counsel.pdf; KEHOE & TANDY, supra note 18; KIM BROOKS & DARLENE
KAMINE, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUSTICE CUr SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO
(2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/OhioAssessment.pdf; ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR., MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mtreport.pdf.
100. See, e.g., Susanne M. Bookser, Making Gault Meaningful: Access to Counsel and Quality
of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings for Indigent Youth, 3 WHITrrER J. CHILD. & FAM.
ADVOC. 297, 305 (2004) (citing the Kentucky state assessment for its description of the
infrastructure of public defender practice that did not support appeals); Jerry R. Foxhoven,
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Quality of Representation for Juveniles Is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY
L. REV. 99, 117 (2007) (citing NJDC's Pennsylvania assessment addressing "non-existent"
appellate advocacy); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at Forty: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court-A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 379-80 (2008) (citing various state
assessments and the interview results contained within them addressing the infrequency of
appeals).
101. See infra Part II.C.
102. See infra Part H.C.
103. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
104. See infra Part II.C.I.
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and is a critical part of the dialogue.os
The lack of vigor in the appellate process for juveniles is attributed
to a variety of causes. Obstacles preventing effective juvenile delin-
quency appellate practice appear to be similar across jurisdictions,
though they vary somewhat according to geography and resources. First,
prevalent waiver of counsel in juvenile courts contributes to the lack of
appeals.10 6 But even when counsel appears, many defenders do not pur-
sue appeals regularly due to lack of resources or other reasons.' While
failure to file an appeal can result in a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, juveniles infrequently file such claims due to structural barriers
and limited knowledge about the right to appeal or the right to bring a
claim for ineffective assistance."os Whether or not the rarity of claims
for ineffective assistance affects the rarity of the use of Anders briefs in
juvenile practice is worthy of further exploration.09
Next, an overreliance on guilty pleas" 0 and a perception that the
stakes are lower for juveniles can lead to a decision to allocate resources
elsewhere where defenders are overwhelmed by high caseloads."'1 The
length of time it takes to resolve appeals may also contribute to the prob-
lem, given that many juveniles will have completed their sentences of
confinement or probation before the appeal is resolved.112 There is also a
lack of authorization, whether it is real or perceived, for public defend-
ers to handle appeals."I In addition, the historical underpinnings of the
105. Cf Findley, supra note 56, at 591 ("Indeed, over the past several decades the Supreme
Court has increasingly emphasized that our elaborate system for appeals is intended to guard
against wrongful conviction of the innocent.").
106. See Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 633 (discussing the relationship between the frequent
waiver of counsel and the low rate of appeals in juvenile cases and noting that opportunities for
appeal by those who waive counsel are rare).
107. Fedders, supra note 70, at 812; see also, KEHOE & TANDY, supra note 18, at 38
(describing that the majority of attorneys questioned indicated that time constraints and financial
considerations hindered effective representation on appeal).
108. Fedders, supra note 70, at 806. (Between 1995 and 2005, over six million youth were
adjudicated delinquent; Fedders finds judicial opinions for 290 cases during that time period
dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel, only forty-one of which resulted in relief from the
appellate court.). Id.
109. A search of juvenile delinquency appeals on Westlaw during the time period between
July 29, 2001 and July 28, 2011 resulted in only seventeen cases discussing the use of Anders
briefs filed by defenders; these cases were limited to five states: California, Florida, New York,
Ohio, and North Carolina.
110. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 12, at 291.
Ill. Fedders, supra note 70, at 812.
112. Interview with Eric Zogry, N.C. Juvenile Pub. Defender (Aug. 2011) (stating that the
average time it takes to resolve an appeal in North Carolina is sixteen months, while the average
juvenile disposition of probation or confinement in the state is only six months).
113. See 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 53; BROOKs & KAMINE, supra note 99, at 21, 33
(discussing a confusion among attorneys about whether representation continued after
disposition).
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juvenile courts as rehabilitative, as opposed to punitive, create a percep-
tion that appeals interfere with the "rehabilitation process."ll 4
The belief that the bar is exceedingly high on appeal may also com-
pound this problem. Most courts use a de novo standard of review for
questions of law and apply a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing
questions of fact in juvenile cases, similar to adult criminal cases."' The
court generally reviews a dispositional order for an abuse of discre-
tion." 6 A statutory challenge to the disposition may be reviewed de
novo." 7
Other more subtle obstacles vary according to jurisdiction. Some
states allow monetary charges to the family of a juvenile whose appeal is
unsuccessful." 8 In at least one state, the window to file a juvenile delin-
quency appeal is only five days, as compared to twenty-one days for
adult criminal cases. 1 9 While shortened filing deadlines for juvenile
appeals can expedite the outcome of the case, they should not be prohib-
itive to a child's ability to exercise the right to file an appeal. Moreover,
if they are not accompanied by a requirement that the appeal will be
resolved on an expedited basis, the effect can be quite limited.
Finally, defenders in urban areas tend to have high caseloads,
which may prevent appellate attention. But there are also problems
unique to rural areas. In rural states there tend to be "fewer qualified
criminal defense appellate lawyers to provide representation to all indi-
gent defendants who choose to exercise their right to appeal."' 20 For
example, in one such state, Wyoming, there are three full-time and one
114. Harris, supra note 20, at 214, 225; see also Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432
(7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 74 F.3d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1996) ("We review
the question of whether the district court erred in denying the juveniles' motion to dismiss,
pursuant to the speedy trial provision ... under a de novo standard of review."); United States v.
Sealed Juvenile 1, 192 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e review factual findings ... for clear
error and the legal conclusions de novo."). But see United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 865 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that factual findings are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, but "the
court's determination of whether a delay is in the interest of justice is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.").
116. See United States v. Brandon P., 387 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
decision to transfer a juvenile to be prosecuted as an adult is reviewed for abuse of discretion);
Phillips v. United States, 238 F. App'x. 89, 95 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a district court decision
that denied a juvenile's request for an evidentiary hearing under an abuse of discretion standard).
117. See United States v. P.S., No. 97-50042, 1997 WL 632591, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 1997)
(reviewing a juvenile's appeal on the basis of a statutory violation under a de novo standard).
118. Fedders, supra note 70, at 812-13 (noting North Carolina and Georgia statutes).
119. Compare ME. REv. SrAT. ArN. tit. 15, § 3402(5) (2003), with ME. R. APP. P. 2(b)(2)(A).
120. Diane E. Courselle, When Clinics are "Necessities, Not Luxuries": Special Challenges of
Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in a Rural State, 75 Miss. L.J. 721, 725 n.5 (2006) (discussing
the challenges of criminal appellate advocacy in rural areas and noting that as the only law school
in the state, the University of Wyoming College of Law has a clinic that sometimes handles 20%
to 25% of the public defender's office appellate caseload in a given year).
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half-time appellate attorneys in the public defender's office serving the
entire state.12'
Appeals are more frequent in adult criminal cases.' 2 2 Yet, even
with these appeals and additional opportunities for transparency and
accountability in the adult criminal context, such as juries and open
courtrooms, wrongful convictions raise concern about fairness in the
criminal justice system.12 3 In many juvenile courts, there is no other
opportunity for outside review or decision-making, or even observation
by another person-even as an onlooker in court. In that way, juvenile
appeals play a critical role.
II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE UNIQUE APPELLATE
ROLE IN JUVENILE COURT
"The appellate process furthers fidelity to the law . . ."124 Appeals
play a unique role in the delinquency context; even beyond providing for
accuracy and integrity in the conclusions, they are often the only vehicle
for public accountability and transparency. In addition, contrary to a
common misperception that juveniles receive only "a slap on the wrist,"
thousands of juveniles are confined each year and face consequences
that will extend beyond adolescence. Finally, the goal to reduce dispro-
portionate minority confinement may be difficult to achieve in a system
with such a reduced level of accountability.
A. Bench Trials and the Absence of Jurors
Courts prosecuting juveniles as delinquents are not required to
grant the right to a jury and therefore most do not.12 5 Even in those
states that allow jury trials for juveniles, they are infrequently
requested.' 26 Given the status of appeals, this leaves the reality that juve-
121. Id. at 726 n.18. (This includes post-conviction work in the state's capital cases.). Id.
122. Harris, supra note 20, at 220.
123. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 54, at 57 (discussing a study of post-conviction
exonerations); Findley, supra note 56, at 591.
124. Robert Schwartz, Exec. Dir., Juvenile Law Ctr., Testimony at Pennsylvania Interbranch
Commission on Juvenile Justice (Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.modelsfor
change.net/reform-progress/49).
125. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Ten states grant a jury trial by
right in most, if not all, cases. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 (1990); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 47.12.110(a) (West 2005); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 56(c) (West 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 3.911(a) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1502(1) (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-2-16(A) (West 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b)(6) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-6(a) (West 2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223(c) (West 1981); In re L.M., 186
P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008).
126. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 12, at 303-04; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public
Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REv. 965, 1107 (1995).
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nile cases are largely determined by one individual.' 27 Juvenile trials are
generally bench trials. Contrary to a common perception about judicial
decision-making, current research on the psychology of judging "cast[s]
doubt on the view that judges ... [can] significantly outperform juries
with respect to the same fact-focused inquiries."' 28 In their analysis of
this issue applied to the juvenile justice system, Guggenheim and Hertz
suggest that "there are at least some situations in which trial judges are
prone-or at least more prone than jurors and appellate judges-to mis-
construe facts in a manner that favors the prosecution."l 29 There is rea-
son to believe, therefore, that claims for insufficiency of the evidence
may be stronger in juvenile cases due to findings that judges more read-
ily convict on less evidence than do juries.13 0 In addition, in bench trials,
sufficiency of the evidence is among the more frequent errors found on
appeal, which is not the case for appeals of jury trials.13 1
The reasons for this difference are not conclusive, but research
offers useful guidance. First, trial judges are generally exposed to inad-
missible evidence and collateral reports before fact-finding, such as
information about prior offenses.132 In the adult context, however, they
are usually not operating as the finders-of-fact at trial because of the
right to a jury trial.' 3 3 In the juvenile system, the judge will make deter-
minations about the admissibility of key evidence despite her role as
fact-finder. Therefore, a juvenile judge can be exposed to evidence that
virtually proves guilt even though he or she rules that it is inadmissible
before proceeding to trial to determine the facts.'3 1
Appellate courts uphold this judicial practice.13 5 Yet, empirical evi-
dence demonstrates that exposure to such "highly prejudicial informa-
tion" affects the decision-making of judges.'3 6 In Joan's hypothetical
127. See supra Part II.
128. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology ofJudging?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 103, 104 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell. eds., 2010).
129. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring
the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 553, 569 (1998).
130. Id. at 564.
131. Joy A. CHAPPFER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT'L CTR. STATE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS: FINAL REPORT 17 (1989), available at http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.138.7077&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
132. See, e.g., Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 129, at 571-72.
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases).
134. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 129, at 571.
135. See generally id. at 571-73; see, e.g., Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1981) (per
curiam).
136. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 129, at 572-73 (citing Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury
Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 1, 27
(1997) (discussing empirical evidence concluding that judges may, in fact, be no better than juries
at "bas[ing] their decisions squarely on legally admissible information")) (internal citation
omitted); see also Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
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case above, for example, the judge would have been exposed to evi-
dence showing that Joan was previously in possession of a knife and to
hearsay from Joan's probation officer that she was allegedly affiliated
with "gang members." It is difficult to argue that a person with this kind
of information will view evidence in a way that is equally objective as a
juror without exposure to these extraneous records about the defendant.
Case law demonstrates that juvenile bench trials, the most common
form of adjudication for juveniles, result in some convictions based on
evidence that "only the most closed-minded or misguided juror" would
find to have satisfied the standard beyond a reasonable doubt.m1 7 Gug-
genheim and Hertz provide several examples of juvenile bench trial
cases reversed by appellate courts during a one-year time period, con-
cluding that the appellate court "easily found" the evidence to be insuffi-
cient in such cases.' Also, consistent with those findings, an analysis
of trial transcripts performed in a New York study in 1984 revealed that
almost 50% of the transcripts included appealable errors, such as viola-
tions of statutory and due process rights. 139 But it found that few were
appealed. 140
Next, even putting those considerations aside, bench trials lack the
features of group decision-making and deliberation present with juries
that reportedly enhance the fact-finding process and reduce biases. 14 1
Judges rely heavily on intuitive versus deliberative decision-making. 142
Groups use deliberative decision-making more frequently than individu-
als, and research suggests that deliberative decision-making leads to
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1251 (2005).
137. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 129, at 564.
138. Id. at 564-65.
139. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 23 (citing JANE KNrZER & MERRIL SOME, LAW
GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 1, 23
(1984)).
140. Id.
141. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the benefits of the jury
process and protecting against individual traits or biases of judges); see also Guggenheim &
Hertz, supra note 129, at 578-79 (describing relevant social scientific studies illustrating the
benefits and processes of group decision-making and dynamics that promote deliberation of
outcomes).
142. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 27-28 (2007) (presenting evidence that judges
are predominantly intuitive decision-makers and arguing that intuitive judgments are often
flawed). The authors also summarize study results suggesting "that judges rely heavily on their
intuitive faculties.. .when they face the kinds of problems they generally see on the bench." Id. at
27. The authors do, however, acknowledge the capacity that "judges can sometimes overcome
their intuitive reactions and make deliberative decisions" despite a large body of research that
would predict otherwise. Id. at 28.
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more just outcomes with less bias.143
Grand juries are also absent from the juvenile process because
delinquency cases do not undergo the indictment process'" Grand
juries are viewed as an instrument that protects against the power of the
state and serves to protect individual rights.145 The absence of grand
juries is yet another stage of group decision-making that does not occur
in the delinquency context.
Absent juries and grand juries, therefore, the appellate level is the
sole opportunity to infuse the benefit of group decision-making into the
juvenile justice process. Although it does not replace the value and role
of the jury deliberation process, when a case is appealed, at least one
group deliberation is formally involved in reviewing the decision. "The
logic underlying the use of groups of judges at the appellate stage is
straightforward: [Dieliberation among a set of judges is intended to
reduce the likelihood of erroneously reversing a correct lower court
decision or erroneously affirming an incorrect lower court decision." 4 6
And with so few appeals, juveniles are left without the benefit of group
deliberation of any kind.
B. Access to Counsel and Closed Courtrooms
The judicial scandal in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, which
became known to the public as the "Kids-for-Cash" scandal,"' illumi-
nated in dramatic fashion the importance of the right to counsel for
juveniles.14 8 The acceptance of bribes by two judges over a five year
period between 2003 and 2008 resulted in the illegal confinement of
numerous juveniles. 9 The judges' criminal acts led the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to overturn thousands of juvenile adjudications as a
result.' The scenario invited increased scrutiny of statutory provisions
143. Id. at 31. Intuitive decision-making is more likely the pathway "by which undesirable
influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system." Id.
144. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (stating that a "juvenile is not entitled ... to indictment
by grand jury . . . .") (citing Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)).
145. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 703, 705-06 (2008).
146. Wendy Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 73, 73 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
147. See, e.g., Associated Press, Pennsylvania: Sentence in 'Kids for Cash' Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2011, at Al l; Michael Rubinkam, Ex-Judge Gets 17'h Years in 'Kids for Cash'
Scandal, Prrr. POST-GAzETTE, Sept. 25, 2011, at B4.
148. See LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY, supra note 80, at i-ii.
149. See id. at 1.
150. Ian Urbina, Pennsylvania Overturns Many Youths' Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2009, at A18; see also Order, In Re: Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne
County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, related to In re J.V.R.,
No 81 MM 2008 (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.jlc.org/sites/default/files/casefiles/
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that allow waiver of counsel by minors because many of the minors who
were involved had waived their right to counsel,' 5 ' making it less likely
that any appeal would be filed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court char-
acterized the behavior by one of the judges, Judge Ciavarella, as an exhi-
bition of "complete disregard for the constitutional rights of the
juveniles who appeared before him without counsel . . . ."152 It also
raised important questions about whether the absence of public partici-
pation from the juvenile process, paired with lack of counsel to affect
appeals, contributed to allowing an environment where these injustices
could occur. In that way, waiver of counsel and closed courtrooms can
compound the effects of the lack of appeals given their joint role in
providing accountability to the public at large.
1. ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Studies report that approximately half of juvenile defendants appear
without counsel due to waiver of the right to counsel.15 3 This same level
of waiver of counsel is not prevalent among adult defendants, although
there are certainly compelling questions about pressures to plea, availa-
bility of counsel, and adequate resources available to represent all
defendants, adult or juvenile.154 Without counsel, appeals are difficult to
realize for juveniles. And it appears that even when counsel appears,
appeals are still infrequently filed.'15
Even before the advent of the increased collateral consequences for
juveniles, Gault extolled the importance of counsel based upon notions
of fundamental fairness. In ensuing years, other courts have all but
erased the distinction between the sources of the right to counsel in the
juvenile versus adult context, suggesting that the Sixth Amendment is
the source of the right for juveniles beyond the dictates of fairness under
Court%200rder%2OAdopting%20and%2OApproving%2OSpecial%2OMaster's%20Third%20
Interim%20Report%20and%2ORecommendatiions.pdf (providing the reasoning and details
supporting the expungement of the five years of adjudications) [hereinafter In Re: Expungement].
151. See In Re: Expungement, supra note 150, at 4 (stating that "independent review of the
transcripts of individual cases disclosed [Judge] Ciavarella's systematic failure to determine
whether a juvenile's waiver of the right to counsel was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
tendered . ... ").
152. Id.
153. Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 580.
154. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for articles involving a thorough discussion of
the pervasive problems of indigent defense across the country. See also Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter, 45 U.C. DAVis REV. 277, 312 (2012) (providing a more complete
discussion of questions raised about availability of representation for adults and pressures to waive
counsel, particularly in cases involving misdemeanors).
155. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-8, 10; see infra Section IH (discussing data about
the rate of appeal in sixteen states between 2006 and 2011 and waiver of counsel).
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Gault.15 6 But this principle is not consistently realized and sometimes
discouraged.'15  For example, in Georgia, the governing statute dictates
appointment of counsel not more than three business days after the per-
son is served or taken into custody.15 1 In reference to the stage of court
proceedings prior to appointment of counsel, however, one judge there
said: "I tell the minor, I will up the sentence if you take it to trial
because you could have pleaded and saved us all of this trouble.""
Therefore, while statutes provide for assignment of counsel, sometimes
early in the process, the implementation by individual courts and the
influence of local cultural norms may override the words in state stat-
utes. Research that reports local norms, such as assessments performed
by the National Juvenile Defender Center, paired with empirical data
included in this study, together provide a more complete understanding
about the extent to which encouragement or discouragement of waiver
of counsel correlates with the rate of appeals.16 0
The Supreme Court requires that a waiver of a constitutional right,
such as right to counsel, is knowing and voluntary.161 It has not
addressed the issue separately for juveniles. For purposes of waiver of
counsel in the context of questioning and Miranda rights, however, the
Court's analysis is based upon the "totality of the circumstances" during
questioning. 162 There are notable problems with this approach, which
156. See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing that the "independent
constitutional right to counsel for juvenile appeals . .. is grounded in the Sixth Amendment's right
to counsel . . . ."); United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016, 1018 (1st Cir. 1991) (relying on Sixth
Amendment cases in the adult context for its finding that "[i]f a juvenile has a right to counsel,
and a right to appeal, she must also have the right to counsel on her first direct appeal"); Reed v.
Duter, 416 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1969) ("Gault must be construed as incorporating in juvenile
court procedures, which may lead to deprivation of liberty ... the constitutional safeguards of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . .").
157. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-8; see, e.g., PURIfZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 3,
at 28; see Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
175, 175 (2007); PATRICIA PURITZ, MARY ANN SCALI & ILONA Picou, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N &
JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 23-24 (2002), available at http://www.
njdc.info/pdflVirginia%20Assessment.pdf. In one Virginia county it was estimated that "50% of
youth waived counsel regardless of the seriousness of the offense." Id. See also Donna M. Bishop
& Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance ofAdolescent Developmental Capacities with
the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 125, 125-26 (2007).
158. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23(b) (2011).
159. PATRICIA PURITZ & TAMMY SUN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR., GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 9-10, 31 (2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf.
160. See infra Part 1II, Table I for relevant data and further discussion.
161. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
162. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979).
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many believe is inadequate as applied to juveniles. 163 An ever-increasing
number of studies question whether juveniles understand what is hap-
pening in their cases or the vocabulary employed by the court, and
whether they have the cognitive ability to understand the rights they are
giving up when they waive the right to counsel.'"
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards recommend that youths
should not be permitted to waive their right to an attorney without: 1)
attorney consultation; 2) a full inquiry from the court into the child's
understanding of that right; and 3) an inquiry into his or her capacity to
understand and intelligently waive the right.' Consider those recom-
mendations in light of Professor Berkheiser's finding that out of ninety-
nine cases where youth waived the right to counsel post-Gault, eighty of
the waivers were overturned on appeal.166 This finding is even more
compelling given the reasonable. assumption that many more claims
challenging validity of waivers would be overturned on appeal had
there been counsel to file the appeal. The same study of juvenile cases
found that courts did little to ensure that juvenile waivers were knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.'16  Juvenile court judges were often character-
ized as finding "waiver by inaction."1 68 In addition, more than three-
quarters of the cases that were overturned for invalid waivers of counsel
had initially resulted in orders of confinement for the juveniles.16 9
An analysis of the laws dictating the practice of waiver of counsel
among states reveals a variety of statutory and case law approaches.
Most state statutes allow waiver of counsel by juveniles and allow it
without advice of counsel. 7 0 Nor is the presence of a parent required, in
many instances, in order for a waiver to be considered knowing and
163. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 173-90 (1984); Thomas Grisso, Adolescents' Decision Making: A
Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 7-12 (2006).
164. See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27-28 (2006).
165. See Sheen, supra note 96, at 513-14 n.155 (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,
supra note 42, at 5-8.2).
166. Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 609.
167. Id. at 611.
168. Id. at 612 (citing case law from Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, and South Dakota appellate
courts). Berkheiser discusses the reversal of a juvenile case by the South Dakota Supreme Court
where the trial court had assumed that the juvenile "had waived his right to counsel by appearing
without an attorney." Id. at 613 (citing In re R.S.B., 498 N.W.2d 646, 647 (S.D. 1993)). This is
particularly troubling and noteworthy given the affirmative duty now placed on defendants to
verbally invoke the right to remain silent under Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264
(2010).
169. Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 645.
170. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 3306 (1978); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 62D.030(4) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:12(II) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
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voluntary."' Some states lack statutes specifically addressing the issue
of waiver by juveniles. In that instance, courts in those states have per-
mitted waivers that the court deems knowing and intelligent.17 2 Some of
those states require the presence of a parent or guardian,17 3 but others do
not. Rhode Island, Alabama, and Oregon do not have statutes addressing
waiver by juveniles, and, in applying the adult standard of waiver, none
of them require parental presence. 17 4
There are some states, however, that afford greater protections sur-
rounding juvenile waiver of counsel. Iowa's law-a rare example-
states that the right to counsel is not waivable by juveniles.17 1 In New
York, the minor is presumed to lack the knowledge and maturity to enter
an effective waiver, and the law requires a full hearing with representa-
tion of counsel. 7 6 Texas also strictly limits the conditions under which a
juvenile may waive.'7 7 Under West Virginia case law, waiver of counsel
will be considered knowing and intelligent only with the advice of coun-
§§ 13.40.140(9), (10) (1981); DEL. FAM. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (requiring waiver in writing unless
it is made in court on the record or in the presence of the custodian); UTAH JUV. P.R. 26(d).
171. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.40.140(9), (10) (allowing waiver of counsel for
juveniles age twelve and above if the waiver is "express" and "intelligently made" after being
informed of the right; a parent or guardian shall provide waiver for children eleven and under);
UTAH JUv. P.R. 26(e) ("A minor fourteen years of age and older is presumed capable of
intelligently comprehending and waiving the minor's right to counsel ... and may do so where the
court finds such waiver to be knowing and voluntary, whether the minor's parent, guardian or
custodian is present.").
172. See, e.g., In re T.D.W., 493 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (applying same standard
as adults for valid waiver); Dellwo v. R.D.B. (In re R.D.B.), 575 N.W.2d 420, 423 (N.D. 1998);
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Afanasiev, 674 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (applying the
standard from State v. Verna, 498 P.2d 793, 797 (Or. Ct. App. 1972)); In re John D., 479 A.2d
1173, 1178 (R.I. 1984); In re R.S.B., 498 N.W.2d 646, 647 (S.D. 1993); Alabama: Juvenile
Indigent Defense Data & Information, NAT'L Juv. DEFENDER CENTER, http://www.njdc.info/sd/
alabama.php (last updated Aug. 2005) (explaining that the adult waiver standard is used for
juveniles) [hereinafter Alabama Data]; see also COLo. R. Juv. P. 3(a)(2); In re J.F.C., 660 P.2d 7,
8 (Colo. App. 1982) (requiring the presence of an adult to meet the knowing and intelligent
standard for juvenile waivers).
173. See Garaas v. D. S. (In re D. S.), 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978); see also COLO. R.
Juv. P. 3 (all waivers of constitutional rights by a juvenile must be in the presence of a parent); In
re J.F.C., 660 P.2d 7, 8 (Colo. App. 1982) (applying the standard that when a juvenile waives a
constitutional right, it must be done in the presence of a parent or guardian).
174. See, e.g., John D., 479 A.2d at 1178. Instead, in Rhode Island, the court "must scrutinize
the admonitions given by the trial justice to the juvenile and his parent, if present, with the utmost
exactitude and care to be certain that they meet the requirements for adults that have been laid
down by this court and by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. The validity of a waiver of
rights by juveniles is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. In re Kean, 520 A.2d
1271, 1276 (R.I. 1987); see also Afanasiev, 674 P.2d at 1200; Alabama Data, supra note 172.
175. IowA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (West 1990).
176. N.Y. FAM. CT. Act § 249-a (McKinney 2011).
177. TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.09 (West 1997) (permitting waiver of the right to counsel by
children); but see TEX. FAM. CODE § 5 1.10(b) (West 2003) (preventing waiver in transfer hearings
to criminal court, adjudication and dispositions hearings, and hearings prior to commitment to the
Texas Youth Commission for disposition modification).
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sel. 7 1 In New Jersey, the statute permits waiver only after consultation
by the child and the parent with counsel.179 In Montana, juveniles may
not waive counsel if they face the potential of commitment to a state
facility for more than six months. 80
Implementation of the waiver in practice can be more revealing
than the statute's text. For example, in some jurisdictions without spe-
cial provisions, juveniles appear regularly with counsel and are not dis-
couraged from exercising this right. In Maine, for example, where
juveniles may waive the right without consulting counsel,18 1 representa-
tion by counsel is not commonly waived and children are reportedly not
pressured to do so.1 8 2 In contrast, it is estimated that 75% of accused
juveniles are not represented by counsel in Wyoming courts.18 3 Many of
the youth waive their right to counsel without fully understanding their
178. A juvenile can waive the right to counsel if the waiver is knowing. See W. VA. CODE
§ 49-5-9(a)(2) (2007). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that a juvenile's
waiver of a constitutional right is valid and knowing only if it is done upon the advice of counsel.
State ex rel. J. M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199, 204 (W. Va. 1981). In Vermont, a child's waiver is
only valid with advice of counsel, along with additional enumerated statutory requirements. The
constitutional rights of any child, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, is valid only
when: (a) there is a factual and legal basis for the waiver; (b) the attorney has investigated the
relevant facts and law, consulted with the client and guardian ad litem, and the guardian ad litem
has consulted with the ward; (c) that the waiver is in the best interest of the ward; and (d) that the
waiver is being entered into knowingly and voluntarily by the ward and also by the guardian ad
litem. VT. R. FAM. P. 6(d)(3). In addition, in a delinquency case, the child's knowing and
voluntary consent shall be required with respect to the waiver. VT. R. FAM. P. 6(d)(4).
179. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39(b)(1)-(2) (West 1983).
180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1413 (2005).
181. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 3306 (1979).
182. See JUDrTH B. JONEs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ACCESS TO COUNSEL 8 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/204063.pdf ("In Maine, waiver of counsel is not a problem. Many district judges
spend time explaining the right to counsel to juveniles and their parents, and some judges refuse to
accept waivers of counsel until a youth has spoken to an attorney."); see also AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEw ENGLAND JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MAINE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGs 32 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf (reporting interviews
confirming that waiver of counsel is not an issue and judges regularly refuse to accept a plea
before juveniles speak with their attorneys); but cf 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
183. ACLU OF Wyo. NAT'L CHAPTER, INEQUALITY IN THE EQUALITY STATE: THE DAMAGED
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DETENTION SYSTEM IN WYOMING 31 (2010), available at http://www.aclu-
wy.org/news-commentary/pub/04061 ljuvejus-report.pdf. The report found that the problem was
"particularly acute in municipal and circuit courts," where juveniles are being tried as adults. Id.
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rights.18 4 And, not surprisingly, few appeals are recorded there."'
The low number of appeals, however, is not limited to cases where
juveniles did not have counsel. 1 6 The notion of "role confusion[,"
where lawyers fall into a "best interest" framework rather than acting as
zealous advocates, is an underlying problem preventing the prominence
of the constitutionally mandated role of the defender.187 "One of the
most pervasive systemic barriers [to zealous juvenile defense] is how the
role of the juvenile defense attorney is misunderstood."1 88 Therefore, in
states with weak protections against waiver of counsel, guaranteeing
juvenile representation of counsel is only the first step toward ensuring
that the state constitutional or statutory right to appeal is realized. Addi-
tionally, where appellate rates remain low despite strong protections
against waiver of counsel at trial, more inspection of defense systems is
warranted.
2. COURTS CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC
States vary in their approaches about whether to open juvenile pro-
ceedings to the public. The majority of states exclude the public and the
media, with exceptions.' Others allow delinquency proceedings to be
primarily open with some restrictions if the public's presence would be
184. Id. Wyoming is the only state that is not in substantial compliance with the Juvenile
Justice Delinquency Prevention Act. See Sheen, supra note 96, at 486 (as of 2010, it was still out
of compliance). This is particularly troubling when one considers that Wyoming has the nation's
highest rate of incarcerated juveniles. Aaron LeClair, Wyoming Leads Nation in Rate of
Incarcerating Youth, COMMUNITY JUST. NETWORK FOR YOUTH (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:19 AM), http://
www.cjny.org/index.php?option=com-content&amp;view=article&amp;id=586:wyoming-leads-
nation-in-rate-of-incarcerating-youth&amp;catid=6:news-and-updates (citing ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., No PLACE FOR KIDS: CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION, (2011), available
at http:/ http://www.aecforg/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/-/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/
Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJNoPlaceForKidsFull.pdf); ACLU of Wyo. NAT'L
CHAPTER, supra note 183, at 15-16 ("Wyoming has one of the highest juvenile detention rates in
the nation, and in 2008 ranked second nationwide for percentage of children under 18 in
custody.").
185. See Sheen, supra note 96, at 505.
186. See generally KEHOE & TANDY, supra note 18, at 37-38; 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note
10, at 10; TEX. APPLESEED, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 14
(2000), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf; see also infra Section III
(discussing the low average rate of appeals in states, such as New Jersey and Texas, with
protections against waiver of counsel for juveniles).
187. See generally Patricia Puritz & Robin Walker Sterling, The Role of Defense Counsel in
Delinquency Court, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2010, at 16.
188. Id.
189. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-129 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(c) (2005); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 676 (West 2012) (providing that the public has no right of access to juvenile court
hearings with exceptions for cases involving charges of violent crimes, including carjacking,
drive-by shooting, and felony criminal street gang activity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-122
(West 2011); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1063(a) (West 1995); D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e) (2005)
(with some exception allowing the press if privacy of child and family are protected); GA. CODE
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harmful in some way.' 90 From the juvenile's perspective, the policy
implications of closed courtrooms can cut both ways. While closed pro-
ceedings protect privacy on the one hand, open proceedings are benefi-
cial because they improve transparency and can serve to minimize
abuses.19 ' In the wake of Pennsylvania's judicial scandal, where two
judges accepted payment for ordering juveniles into confinement to spe-
cific facilities, for example, the state's special commission emphasized
the critical role of transparency and emphasized the importance of public
ANN. § 15-11-78(a) (West 2010) (proceedings are closed in general but open to the public for
certain designated felonies or if child has prior adjudications); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-41(b)
(West 2010); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5(6) (West 2006) (excluding the public but
allowing the news media while granting the court the authority to prohibit disclosure of the
minor's identity); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 65 (1996) (juvenile proceedings are closed except where juvenile is indicted); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.045 (West 2007); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(6) (West 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.171(6) (West 2004); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-277 (1997) (statute is silent, but under NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-2,108 (1997) juvenile court records are not public); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-B:34 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-51(1) (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10A, § 1-4-503(A)(1) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.035 (2010) (court records are closed
to the public); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(d) (West 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-30
(West 1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-590 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36 (1996); TENN.
R. Juv. P. 27 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-114 (West 2008) (as interpreted by Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v Hornak, 917 P.2d 79, 82-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
302(c) (West 1996) (court shall be closed unless youth is over fourteen and charged with felony
equivalent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(6) (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-2(i)
(West 2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.299 (West 2009); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-224(b) (West
2004); MINN. R. Juv. DELINQ. P. 2.01; MINN. R. Juv. DELINQ. P. 18.05 (closed to the public
unless the child is sixteen and charged with the equivalent of a felony); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 122.01
(hearings are generally open to the public, but subject to some exceptions); N.J. CT. R. 5:19-2(2);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (West 1995), repealed by 2007 VT. ADJ. SESs. § 13.
190. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i) (West 2011); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-106(2)
(West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.035(1) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-525(1) (West
1997) (proceedings are open if the juvenile is fourteen years or older and the offense would be a
felony charge if committed by an adult); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6-3 (West 1997) (open to the
public if charge is equivalent of a felony for an adult); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.39 (West 1988);
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 879(B) (2011) (open to the public for a crime of violence or repeat
offender); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17(7) (West 1999) ("[T]he court may close the
hearing of a case . .. if the court finds that closing the hearing is necessary to protect the welfare
of the juvenile witness or the victim."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.28(2) (West 1999)
(records are presumptively public); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1502(7) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 62.D010 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(B) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7B-2402 (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (West 2002); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 54.08(a); IOWA R. Juv. P. 8.32 (1)-(2) (2002) (the court may exclude the public but
juvenile records in delinquency cases are public in general, unless public is excluded from the
courtroom); N.Y. R. CT. 205.4(b); OHIO R. Juv. P. 27(A)(1), cmt. (may close hearing to the public
but must first conduct a hearing about closure decision).
191. See LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY, supra note 80, at ii, vi. After the judicial scandal in
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, the Special Commission report on reform emphasized that
"[rieforms must begin with the right mandates, but they must also be accompanied by
accountability and transparency." Id. at 2; Increasing accountability and transparency was one of




Juvenile defendants now face significant collateral consequences,
more so than they did in the 1980s.'" As the collateral consequences of
juvenile adjudications become more severe, thorough appellate review is
even more significant for minors. The courts acknowledge the signifi-
cance of collateral consequences by ruling that these consequences pre-
vent appeals from becoming moot, even where a child has already
served the terms of confinement or other punishment. 194 Yet, their sig-
nificance remains under-acknowledged with the lack of procedural fair-
ness present in many juvenile courts. This section focuses on those
consequences that relate to the criminal justice system. 95
1. ADULT SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS AND PREDICATE OFFENSES
Juvenile adjudications may be counted as criminal convictions for
purposes of adult sentencing under both federal and state law. 196 As the
practice emerged in recent years, federal and state courts have upheld
the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences, despite the
absence of juries and their supposed status as "non-convictions."' The
192. LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY, supra note 80, at ii.
193. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles
About the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEv. L.J. I 11, 1114-15 (2006)
194. See T.S.G. v. Juvenile Officer (In re T.S.G.), 322 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
(noting that narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine include collateral consequences and
applying it in the juvenile delinquency context); In re Stanley F., 908 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010) ("[B]ecause there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication
of delinquency, the appeal . . . has not been rendered academic."); In re S.J.C., 304 S.W.3d 563,
568 (Tex. App. 2010) ("[Collateral consequences that satisfy the mootness exception in the
delinquency context include] the retention of the adjudication by the court and juvenile officers,
the use of such records in assessing future punishments, and the publishing of the juvenile record
in the event the individual is later charged with a felony."). In addition, "an adjudication of
delinquency could effect [sic] admission to a profession, the armed services or private
employment." Id. at 569. See also Commonwealth v. Keon K., 875 N.E.2d 498, 499 n.1 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007) (reviewing commitment to detention issue based on mootness exception
recognizing that juvenile adjudication has potential collateral consequences in future criminal
proceedings, such as at sentencing and when setting bail).
195. For a more complete discussion of civil considerations such as housing and education, see
generally Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools
and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (2004).
196. See Pinard, supra note 193 at 1114-15 (noting the use of juvenile adjudications in adult
sentencing enhancements); see also Redi Kasollja, Comment, Criminal Law-First Circuit
Upholds Constitutionality of Juvenile Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the Armed Career
Criminal Act-United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007), 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
369, 373 (2008).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005); People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 632-33 (Colo.
2006) (en banc); Nichols v. State, 910 So. 2d 863, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam);
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majority of courts rejected the argument that the use of juvenile adjudi-
cations as sentencing enhancements is unconstitutional under the
Apprendi v. New Jersey1 9 8 and Blakely v. Washington'9 9 requirement
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."20
The Supreme Court stated that the use of prior criminal convictions
was a limited exception to the general rule that a jury finding was neces-
sary.2 0 ' This ruling led to the question about whether juvenile adjudica-
tions fit within the scope of that exception and most courts entertaining
the question upheld the practice.2 0 2 The courts relied in part on due pro-
cess protections provided to juveniles, such as the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to counsel, to "ensure the accu-
racy of the fact-finding proceedings without the need for a jury."203
Because McKeiver v. Pennsylvania held that lack of juries would not
threaten the reliability of fact-finding proceedings, 2 4 courts held that the
Apprendi Court's concerns with procedural safeguards requiring the reli-
ability of fact-finding proceedings were satisfied.20 5 But even before
Apprendi, the reasonableness of using juvenile adjudications in this
manner generated lively debate and disagreement.2 06 Moreover, there
are questions about the fairness of this policy outside of the issue
Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2005) (upholding the use of juvenile adjudications in
adult sentencing enhancements); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1104 (2003); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 617 (Minn. 2006); State v. Weber, 112 P.3d
1287, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a defendant's prior juvenile adjudications can be
considered prior convictions for purposes of sentencing enhancement under Apprendi and
Blakely), affd, 149 P.3d 646, 660 (Wash. 2006). The Federal Armed Career Offender Act permits
adjudications to be used as enhancements. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), (5) (2006); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.2(d) (2001). But see United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d
1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001) (limiting the prior conviction exception to "prior convictions that were
themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt"); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004) (holding that juvenile
adjudications cannot be used to enhance felony convictions pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:529.1 (2010)).
198. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
199. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
200. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 323; Hitt, 42 P.3d at 740; Weber,
112 P.3d at 1292.
201. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
202. See supra note 197 for a list of the relevant cases that ruled on the issue of the use of
juvenile adjudications.
203. See, e.g., Weber, 112 P.3d at 1293.
204. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544-47 (1971).
205. See supra note 197 for a discussion of cases partaking in this analysis.
206. Tonya K. Cole, Note, Counting Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes Under California's
'Three Strikes' Law: An Undermining of the Separateness of the Adult and Juvenile Systems, 19 J.
Juv. L. 335, 339-42 (1998).
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presented under Apprendi. These questions are due to underlying differ-
ences between the way that juvenile and criminal cases are tried in prac-
tical terms.207
The fact that the appellate function is nearly non-existent in many
juvenile cases is increasingly relevant to court reasoning that relies on
assurances of accuracy and due process.2 0 8 With so few appeals, it is
difficult to determine whether due process requirements are actually
met.209
Next, in some states, juvenile adjudications may be used as predi-
cate offenses to enhance charges.2 10 Where it is not expressly stated in
the statute, there is little case law from adult criminal or juvenile courts
about whether courts may allow the practice without explicit statutory
guidance.2 1 1 This lack of case law makes it difficult to gauge the preva-
lence of the practice, but the Ohio Supreme Court recently upheld the
use of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult charge into a
felony.m Previously, in at least two states, courts held that prior adjudi-
cations could not be used to enhance charges in juvenile court, as they
did not constitute "convictions."213 Other state statutes expressly allow
juvenile adjudications to count as predicates.2 14 In that situation, a juve-
207. See generally Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 646; Joseph I. Goldstein-Breyer, Calling
Strikes Before He Stepped to the Plate: Why Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Be Used to
Enhance Subsequent Adult Sentences, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 65, 90-95.(2010).
208. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429-32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority decision by concluding that juvenile adjudications
should not be used as criminal convictions for enhancement purposes, and discussing the lack of
appeals and other factors as support for his conclusion).
209. See Berkheiser, supra note 96, at 607-08 (discussing why the right to counsel in juvenile
courts is nearly "fictional").
210. See, e.g., State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Minn. 2006) (listing juvenile
adjudications that qualify as predicate offenses that will enhance later charges under Minnesota
law); State v. Adkins, 951 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ohio 2011) (holding that state constitutional
prohibition on retroactive statutes did not preclude allowing a prior juvenile adjudication to be
considered a prior criminal offense for purposes of enhancing charge for operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of alcohol). See generally John Mahoney & Cynthia McCollum, DW's
Cautionary Tale, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 794-817 (2011) (noting the numerous instances
where Minnesota authorizes juvenile adjudications to enhance adult misdemeanor charges to
felony charges).
211. See Mahoney & McCollum, supra note 210, at 782 (discussing the absence of any
reported Minnesota case that directly addressed the use of prior adjudications as charge
enhancements as an impetus for the article).
212. Adkins, 951 N.E.2d at 769-70.
213. In re J.E.M., 890 P.2d 364, 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that prior adjudication for
theft could not be used to enhance charge from a misdemeanor to a felony in juvenile court under
the state's theft statute); In re Welfare of L.G.S., 568 N.W.2d 182, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding as a matter of first impression that prosecutor could not enhance a misdemeanor assault
because the youth's prior adjudication did not constitute a prior "conviction" within the meaning
of the statutory enhancement scheme).
214. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(D) (West 2011) (allowing a prior
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nile adjudication for certain crimes is treated the same way as a criminal
conviction and enhances an adult charge from a misdemeanor charge to
a felony charge.2 15
2. DNA REGISTRATION
All states now require the collection and entry of DNA by persons
convicted of certain crimes into state databases linked to the Federal
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). 2 16 While initially limited to
serious crimes, collection has expanded and some states include misde-
meanors. 2 17 In addition, while federal law was the first to require collec-
tion before a conviction,218 states are rapidly passing laws that require
all or some arrestees to submit DNA samples.219 Juveniles are increas-
ingly included in the registration where states have decided to equate
adjudications with convictions.2 20 Currently, about half of the states also
require DNA from felony arrestees.22 1 Some of these states also require
juveniles arrestees to provide DNA sampling. 22 2
As this area of law quickly expands, courts are now faced with
unique questions about juvenile DNA collection. Courts have generally
upheld statutes requiring collection from juveniles.22 3 Unlike other juve-
juvenile adjudication for a felony to result in a felony firearm possession charge that would
otherwise be a misdemeanor).
215. See Mahoney & McCollum, supra note 210, at 794-817 (describing the practical
implications of using juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses).
216. Federal funding and creation of CODIS allowed for the link between state and federal
systems. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope
of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 127, 128 (2001). All states enacted
enabling legislations to develop a linked system between the state and the federal databases. Id.
217. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29
§ 4713(b)(1) (West 2012), MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a) (West 2012).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2006).
219. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102a (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325
(West 2012), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A (West 2011).
220. As of 2010, thirty-five states required at least some juveniles to submit to DNA testing.
See State Laws on DNA Databanks: Qualifying Offenses, Others Who Must Provide Sample,
NAT'L CONF. ON ST. LEGISLATUREs (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/
state-laws-on-dna-data-banks.aspx.
221. Sarah Hammond, The DNA Factor, STATE LEGISLATURES (June 2010), at 13, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MBCbsaSBQxQ%3d&tabid=20358.
222. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-238.A (1996); FLA. STAT. § 943.325(2)(g), (3)(a)
(2000) (including juveniles in the provision requiring "qualifying offenders" to submit to DNA
testing at the time of arrest for felonies or attempted felonies); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (West
2009); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 53:1-20.18 (West 1994) (requiring DNA from every juvenile arrested for
certain violent crimes).
223. See, e.g., People v. Calvin S. (In re Calvin S.), 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (upholding statute requiring juvenile to submit DNA sample after adjudication for felony
car theft as valid government interest under the Fourth Amendment); People v. Lakisha M. (In re
Lakisha M.), 882 N.E.2d 570, 582 (Ill. 2008) (holding that collection of DNA swab from a
juvenile and inclusion in state database did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the privacy
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2012] JUVENILE JUSTICE APPEALS 705
nile records attached to adjudication, DNA will not be expunged or
destroyed when the juvenile becomes an adult.2 24 The collection and
retention of juveniles' DNA raises compelling issues relevant to the
importance of appeals in the juvenile system, three of which are
included here. First, in many instances, a juvenile adjudication will
require the same DNA registration requirement as it would for an adult,
raising the importance of a correct case outcome. Second, where states
require DNA from arrestees, the outcome of the case at trial or appeal
will determine the defendant's ability to have the sample removed and
destroyed.22 5 In order to have a DNA sample of a juvenile or adult arres-
tee destroyed and removed from the registry, state laws require the case
to be dismissed.22 6 Otherwise, the arrestee's DNA sample will be
retained in the state database, linked to CODIS. Third, DNA registration
of a juvenile and the subsequent retention of the sample can affect the
families of juveniles due to law enforcement's ability to conduct intra-
familial DNA searches.22 7 Therefore, the reliability of the outcome at the
trial level and access to appellate review is related to the collection of
DNA upon both arrest and conviction.
clause of the Illinois Constitution); In re Welfare of M.L.M., 781 N.W.2d 381, 389 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010) (upholding constitutionality of statute requiring DNA collection from juveniles
adjudicated delinquent for a misdemeanor under statute that applies to "those who have been
adjudicated delinquent for an offense that arises from the same set of circumstances as a charged
felony"); see also State v. Poitra, 785 N.W.2d 225, 231-32 (N.D. 2010) (holding that a juvenile
does not have the right to an attorney or parental notification when police have a warrant to collect
his DNA).
224. Statutes that require the collection of DNA upon arrest typically contain expungement
provisions to provide a mechanism for deletion only if there is an acquittal or dismissal not based
upon a person's juvenile status. See, e.g., infra note 225 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(M) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective February 16, 2012 of the Second Regular Session of the Fiftieth Legislature) (allowing
expungement of DNA only where defendant's case results in dismissal or acquittal and upon
application by the defendant); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(16) (West, Westlaw through 2012
Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Second Legislature through February 16, 2012)
(expungement of DNA permitted only upon submission of a court order by the defendant proving
case dismissed); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(h)-(i) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2012-
1 of the 2011 General Assembly) (dictating parameters of removal of DNA upon dismissal of the
case).
226. Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J., Nov. 2009, at 11.
227. See generally Henry T. Greely, Daniel P. Riordan, Nanibaa' A. Garrison & Joanna L.
Mountain, Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETmcs 248, 255-59 (2006); Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA
Familial Searching, 23 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 309, 318-22 (2010).
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3. SEX OFFENDER NOTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION ACT
Sex offender registration for juveniles is another example of signif-
icant consequences extending beyond the juvenile court's age jurisdic-
tion and the importance of ensuring accuracy. The federal Sex Offender
Notification and Registration Act (SORNA)2 28 was amended in 2006 to
require states to pass uniform sex offender registration and community
notification laws applicable to juveniles above the age of fourteen. 229 At
the time of its passage, over thirty states had some form of sex offender
registration for juveniles.230  For example, Delaware law treated
juveniles the same as adults for purposes of its registration requirements
beginning in 2001 and the statute contains no minimum age.231 Some
states did not include a community notification requirement for juveniles
with sex offenses; rather, only law enforcement could view the regis-
try.23 2 The federal legislation sought to provide a uniform framework
across jurisdictions.2 33 Under SORNA, states that fail to "substantially
implement" its provisions are entitled to less funding from Byrne Justice
Assistance Grants.234
Under SORNA, states are required to implement registration for
juveniles found delinquent for certain sex offenses.2 3 5 While federal law
requires registration for youths over the age of fourteen based upon a
tiered level of offenses, states are permitted to pass more restrictive stat-
utes based upon age or offense.236 For example, some states do not have
228. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006).
229. Id. §§ 16911(8), (10), 16912(a).
230. Roxanne Lieb & Scott Matson, Sex Offender Registration: A Review of State Laws,
WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, 13-20 (July 1996), http://wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/regsrtn.pdf.
231. See Fletcher v. State (In re Matter of Fletcher), No. 0404010688, 2008 WL 2912048, at
*3 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jun. 16, 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4121(a)(4)b (West, Westlaw current
through 78 Laws 2011, chapters 1-203 and technical corrections received from the Delaware
Code Revisors for 2011 Acts) (providing that any juvenile charged as an adult and found
delinquent of enumerated offenses will be subject to registration under the statute).
232. See Britney M. Bowater, Comment, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006: Is there a Better Way to Tailor the Sentences of Juvenile Sex Offenders?, 57 CATH. U. L.
REV. 817, 830-31 (2008) (discussing the variations among states with regard to community
notification and registration requirements applicable to juveniles).
233. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,
210 (May 30, 2007).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2006).
235. Id. § 16911 (defining juveniles at least fourteen years old that commit an offense
comparable or more severe than "aggravated sexual abuse" as sex offenders); The National
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30, 212 (May 30, 2007).
236. See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg.
30,210, 30,216 (May 30, 2007) ("[T]he inclusions and exclusions in the definition of 'conviction'
for purposes of SORNA do not constrain jurisdictions from requiring registration by additional
individuals-e.g., more broadly defined categories of juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sex
offenses-if they are so inclined.").
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an age minimum at which registration will be required.237 Under
SORNA, a juvenile must register the same information as an adult,
including his personal information.2 3 8 Such information includes, but is
not limited to, a photograph, address, and vehicle information.239 With
some exceptions for good behavior, the government generally retains
this information for a minimum of fifteen years-possibly for life. 2 40
Residency restrictions also apply, affecting where a juvenile can
reside.24' Under the required federal statutory scheme, a person who
fails to comply with continued registration will be charged with a fel-
ony.24 2 Therefore, a child adjudicated delinquent may later be charged
with a felony if he fails to comply with the registration requirements
whether he or she fails to do so as a juvenile or later as an adult; for
offenses deemed as Tier Three, a person must appear in person every
three months for life.243
Disagreements about the overly inclusive SORNA provisions as
applied to juveniles have generated considerable discussion.2 44 Most
states have opted not to fully conform with SORNA; Delaware, Florida,
Michigan, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming are the only states that
the federal government deemed to be in full compliance as of 201 1.245
Many states, nevertheless, requireguvenile sex offenders to register in at
237. Jessica E. Brown, Note, Classifying Juveniles "Among the Worst Offenders": Utilizing
Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adolescent Sex
Offenders, 39 STETSON L. REv. 369, 379 (2010).
238. Cf The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg.
30, 210, 30, 220-23 (May 30, 2007) (explaining the registration requirements for "sex
offenders").
239. Id.
240. Id. at 30, 232.
241. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency
Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 101 (2007) (discussing sex offender
residency restrictions).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2006) (requiring states to impose a minimum prison sentence
of one year for sex offenders who fail to comply with registration requirements).
243. Id. § 16916(3).
244. See Chrysanthi Leon, David L. Burton & Dana Alvare, Net Widening in Delaware: The
Overuse of Registration and Residential Treatment for Youth Who Commit Sex Offenses, 17
WIDENER L. REV. 127, 129 (2011); Krista L. Schram, Note, The Need for Heightened Procedural
Due Process Protection in Juvenile Sex Offender Adjudications in South Dakota: An Analysis of
The People in the Interest of Z.B., 55 S.D. L. REv. 99, 113-16 (2010) (discussing community
notification provisions for minor sex offenders and public website dissemination of the
information and arguing that youths are denied procedural due process under the current statutory
scheme); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rav. 435, 478-81 (2010).
245. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Justice Department
Announces Four More Jurisdictions Implement Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(May 12, 2011), available at http://www.ojp.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/201 1/SMART 11102.
htm.
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least some capacity.24 6
Overall, the prevalence of sex offense arrests among juveniles is
comparatively low and represented less than one percent of the juvenile
delinquency arrests in 2008.247 A disproportionate number of juvenile
delinquency opinions published in recent years, however, involve sex
offenses. 2 4 8 As states litigate the constitutional, procedural, and statutory
issues raised by sex offender registration, the issue is likely to continue
to generate appellate attention. This notable appellate attention was due,
in large part, to juvenile sex offender registration requirements imple-
mented by states, along with state efforts to comply with SORNA post-
2006. These laws raise constitutional challenges and have created issues
of first impression for state courts in recent years. 24 9 For example, most
recently, an Ohio court of appeals ruled that the juvenile court provision
requiring sex offender registration violated procedural due process to the
extent that it prematurely required automatic lifetime sex offender regis-
tration by a juvenile without the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence
246. Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and SORNA, NAT'L CONF. ON ST. LEGISLATURES
(May 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-researchljustice/juvenile-sex-offender-registration-and-
sorna.aspx.
247. Out of 2.11 million juvenile arrests in 200, there were 17,840 arrests for sex offenses, as
compared to 439,600 for property crimes. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 1, 3 (2009),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/228479.pdf.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 255 P.3d 110, 111 (Mont. 2011) (upon remand
from the United States Supreme Court, holding that juvenile's duty to remain registered as a sex
offender with the state was not contingent upon his federal supervision order); In re D.C.N., 264
P.3d 517 (Mont. 2011) (upholding trial court's requirement to register as a sex offender); Divide
Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't v. M.W. (In re M.W.), 785 N.W.2d 211, 212 (N.D. 2010); In re Harrison,
992 A.2d 990 (R.I. 2010) (sexual assault case dealing with statutory interpretation); In re Miguel
A., 990 A.2d 1216, 1218 (R.I. 2010); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008) (upholding sex
offender registration requirement for juvenile sex offender and rejecting argument that registration
as a sex offender should give rise to constitutional right to jury trial in delinquency proceedings);
People ex rel. Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 2008); State v. Larry T., 697 S.E.2d 110, 112 (W. Va.
2010). Notably, sex offenses appeared in 11% of juvenile appellate opinions, or 389 out of 3,426,
cases over a ten-year period. See infra Part IV (discussing the substance of juvenile delinquency
appellate opinions that were studied for the period between July 2001 and July 2011 and the
methods of the search to approximate the grouping of juvenile delinquency appeals).
249. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 974 A.2d 188, 190-95 (Del. 2009) (discussing two issues of
first impression regarding the interaction between the state's sex offender registration statute and
its juvenile expungement statute); State ex rel. B.P.C., 23 A.3d 937, 953-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2011) (remanding for a hearing to determine whether a youth was fully aware of the
consequences of his guilty plea and the resulting requirement to register for life as a sex offender
for sexual contact in the fourth degree when evidence of his knowledge was unclear); Richard A.,
946 A.2d at 212-214 (upholding statute requiring sex offender registration for juveniles and
rejecting the argument that registration as a sex offender gives rise to a constitutional right to a
jury trial in delinquency proceedings); Z.B., 757 N.W.2d at 600 (finding an equal protection
violation for the harsher treatment of juveniles under the state's sex offender registration law,
which did not provide juveniles a chance to have their names removed from the registry via a
suspended sentence).
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of rehabilitation upon completion of a program.250 Also, in 2011, a New
Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile's plea was not valid where it
was unclear from the record whether the juvenile's attorney informed
him that he would have to register as a sex offender. 25 1 As states litigate
the constitutional, procedural, and statutory issues raised by sex offender
registration, alleged juvenile sex offenses are likely to continue to gener-
ate appellate attention.
The prevalence of juvenile-sex-offense appellate opinions indicates
that, at least in these instances, there is recognition that the conse-
quences for juveniles are severe. Still, while the issue seems to stir more
appellate attention than others, most cases involving sex offender regis-
tration still appear to go unchallenged on appeal. For example, while it is
unknown how many juveniles have been required to register as sex
offenders nationally, in Michigan alone approximately 3,563 juveniles
were registered as sex offenders as of February 2010.252 Yet, there are
few appellate opinions discussing such cases in the state. The require-
ment to renew his or her registration generally remains part of a juve-
nile's life for a minimum of fifteen years in Michigan. 253 Adult
sentencing consequences, enhanced charges, DNA registration, and sex
offender registration are just four examples of areas where juvenile adju-
dications and accompanying errors can have lifelong consequences. Pol-
icies employing the wide-reaching use of juvenile adjudications and
courts interpreting them should carefully consider the implications of
infrequent review and lack of access to appeals when considering when
juvenile case outcomes are reliable.
D. Disproportionate Minority Confinement
Each decision-point in the juvenile justice system is crucial to
understanding the overall disparities for minorities in the system. Unde-
niably, however, it is a judge who makes the final determination to send
a child home or to send him or her to a locked facility. Indeed, progress
toward reducing disproportionate minority confinement in the juvenile
justice field "is obstructed by the constant and misdirected citation of
extrajudicial factors as the only causes contributing to disparities. "254
250. In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d 367, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
251. B.P.C., 23 A.3d at 953-54 (reversing in part and holding that there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that juvenile was aware of the penal consequence of sexual offender
registration).
252. David Alire Garcia, Juveniles Crowd Michigan Sex Offender Registry, THE MICH.
MESSENGER (Feb. 10, 2010, 7:27 AM), http://michiganmessenger.com/34538/juveniles-well-
represented-on-mich-sex-offender-registry.
253. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.725(10)-(l 1) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2012, No. 52,
of the 2012 Regular Session, 96th Legislature).
254. JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDoLFI, W. HAYWOOD BuRNs INST., ADORATION OF THE
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State statutes generally provide judges with broad discretion in making
the decision to confine a juvenile.2 55 Studies show that judges issue
more severe sanctions to youth of color than to white youth for similar
behavior.25 6 In addition, black youth are ordered by judges into residen-
tial confinement at a 27% greater rate than white youth.257 But 64% of
the youth handled by the juvenile system are white, and only 33% are
black.258
Though disparate treatment of minorities in the justice system is
not a new problem and surely not a problem that is limited to the juve-
nile system, attention to disproportionate minority contact and confine-
ment of juveniles has increased in recent years.25 9 In 1992, the reduction
of minority confinement became a core requirement of the Juvenile Jus-
QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE To REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2008), available at http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%
2OAdoration%20of%2Othe%20Question 2.pdf.
255. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Diference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 848-49 (1988) ("[T]he
contemporary juvenile sentencing provisions of most states reflect their Progressive origins.
Following an adjudication of delinquency, the state statutes typically offer a range of sentencing
alternatives-dismissal, probation, out-of-home placement, or institutional confinement-and
give the juvenile court judge broad discretion to impose an appropriate disposition."); 1995 ABA
REPORT, supra note 9, at 36-37 (courts have "very broad discretion" when ordering disposition for
juveniles).
256. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 254, at 9; see generally Donna M. Bishop & Charles E.
Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 392 (1996). The report found that the effect of race was pronounced at
each stage of the juvenile court processing system and also had a significant effect on the outcome
of the case. Id. Professor Barry Feld characterizes Bishop and Frazier's study as "one of the most
sophisticated and comprehensive studies of juvenile justice dispositional decision-making." See
BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, 1, 969 (3d. ed.
2009).
257. CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2007 2 (2010),
available at https://ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/230168.pdf [hereinafter 2007 DOJ REPORT].
258. Id.
259. See generally NEELUM ARYA, FRANCISCO VILLARRUEL, CASSANDRA VILLANUEVA & IAN
AUGARTEN, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE & NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, AMERICA'S INVISIBLE
CHILDREN: LATINO YOUTH AND THE FAILURE OF JUSTICE 5-8 (2009), available at http://www.
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/LatinoBrief.pdf; JAMES BELL, LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI,
MICHAEL FINLEY & CLINTON LACEY, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., THE KEEPER AND THE KEPT:
REFLECTIONS ON LOCAL OBSTACLES To DISPARITIES REDUCTION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS
AND A PATH TO CHANGE 2 (2009), available at http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20
Keeper%20Kept.pdf; CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY,
NATIVE AMERICAN YOUTH AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2008), available at http://www.
nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2008_FocusNativeAmerican.pdf; Jost D. SAAVEDRA, NAT'L COUNCIL
OF LA RAZA, JUST THE FACTs: A SNAPSHOT OF INCARCERATED HISPANIC YOUTH (2010), available
at http://www.nclr.org/index.php/site/pub-download/just-the-facts_a_snapshot-of-incarcerated
hispanic-youth; Edgar Cahn & Cynthia Robbins, An Offer They Can't Refuse: Racial Disparity in




tice Delinquency and Prevention Act (JJDPA). 26 0 The JJDPA has led
policy makers to explore more effective ways to reduce minority con-
finement and attempt to understand its causes, 261 but the disproportion-
ate minority contact reduction requirement of the JJDPA remains
understudied, unacknowledged, or unknown to many."262 This core
requirement has remained in place, however, and it has been difficult to
realize improvements. It does not include a quota or percentage reduc-
tion goal, but rather requires states to assess whether they have dispro-
portionate minority representation in the juvenile justice system-both
contact and confinement rates. If this problem is present, they must
determine the reasons for the disproportion and create an intervention
plan for reduction.263
While the negative consequences of the lack of appeals extend to
all youth, a recent study of exonerated youth is informative about the
effects on minority youth.2 6 The data revealed that out of 103 juvenile
exonerees, nearly three-quarters of them were minority youth. 65 Fifty-
nine (57.3%) were African-American and fifteen (14.6%) were
Latino.266 Twenty-five (24.3%) were white and the race of the remaining
four juveniles was unknown. 2 67 The study highlights why great care
must accompany trials and their appellate review for all youth, but it
also illustrates the greater risk for minority youth. A study on juvenile
wrongful convictions revealed that convictions were based on false con-
fessions by police-induced questioning, prosecutorial misconduct via
violations of Brady v. Maryland, unreliable witness statements, and false
guilty pleas.2 68 Lack of protections against wrongful convictions, includ-
ing vigilance and oversight about the factors that lead to them, reveals
the danger to minority youth and implicates efforts to reduce dispropor-
tionate minority contact and confinement.
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2006) (requiring states to submit reports detailing how they have
designed their juvenile delinquency prevention efforts and system improvements to reduce the
disproportionate number of juvenile minorities as a condition of 25% of their grant allocation).
261. See, e.g., Michael J. Leiber & Kristan C. Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention on
Juvenile Justice Decision Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 471 (2005) (studying
disproportionate minority confinement for African-American youth in Iowa).
262. Michael J. Leiber & Nancy Rodriguez, The Implementation of the Disproportionate
Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC) Mandate: A Failure or Success?, 1 RACE & JUST. 103, 104
(2011).
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2006) (requiring states to submit reports detailing how they have
designed their juvenile delinquency prevention efforts and system improvements to reduce the
disproportionate number of juvenile minorities as a condition of 25% of their grant allocation).




268. Id. at 904-15.
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For those states with the highest rates of disproportionate confine-
ment of African- American children, those children are incarcerated at a
rate that is between "twelve and twenty-five times" that of white chil-
dren.2 69 For Latino youth, New Hampshire has the greatest disparity,
incarcerating them at a rate of more than seventeen times that of white
children.27 0 In those states with higher numbers of Native American
children, the disproportionate rates of confinement are also significant.
Nationally, Native Americans are detained at two-and-a-half times the
rate of white children.2 7 1 Data describing disproportionate minority con-
tact and confinement are not representative of minority youth simply
committing more crimes than other youth. For example, nationally,
Latino youth are admitted to state facilities at higher rates than whites,
even when charged with the same crimes, sometimes at rates twelve
times higher than white youth.2 72 African-American youth are arrested at
twice the rate of white youth despite research showing that white youth
are just as likely or more likely to be involved in the use and sale of
drugs.27 3 Minority youth are also arrested, charged, and detained at
higher rates.274
These disparities have been difficult for state juvenile justice sys-
tems to address. There must be accountability and inquiry at all points in
the decision-making process to eliminate disparities.27 5 The realization
of effective appeals are one more potential way to address discrepancies
in decisions that lead to juvenile confinement and the steps that precede
the judge's ultimate decision. In the examination of juvenile delinquency
opinions available for review, few indicated challenges to
dispositions.27 6
269. Gary Ford, The New Jim Crow: Male and Female, South and North, From Cradle to
Grave, Perception and Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in America's Criminal Justice System,
11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 324, 345 (2010); Race and Incarceration in the United States:
Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Hum. RTs. WATCH (Feb. 27, 2002), http://www.hrw.
org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/race/ [hereinafter Hum. RTs. WATCH].
270. HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 269, at tbl. 7.
271. See HARTNEY, supra note 259, at 6.
272. JESSICA SHORT & CHRISTY SHARP, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-8 (2005), available at http://www.
cwla.org/programs/juvenilejustice/disproportionate.pdf.
273. JEFF ARMOUR & SARAH HAMMOND, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
MInoRITY YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 4
(2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/minoritiesinjj.pdf.
274. Id.
275. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 256, at 392. "Because the juvenile justice system
consists of multiple decision points, it is essential that researchers track cases from arrest to final
disposition through as many stages as possible." Id.
276. See infra Part IV.B.3 (describing the author's examination of appellate opinions
addressing challenges to juvenile dispositions).
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III. APPELLATE RATES FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES
Juvenile caseloads make up a small percentage of incoming cases
in state trial courts, comprising an average of two percent of all cases
heard.277 That small percentage, however, represents an estimated 1.7
million juvenile delinquency cases processed by state courts in a given
year.278 According to the most recent data, there were 81,015 children
residing in juvenile detention and correctional facilities in 2008.279 This
represents a decline from 2006, when there were 92,093 confined
juveniles,2 8 0 just as the numbers of juvenile cases processed have
declined.
It is unknown how many of those cases were ever reviewed by an
appellate court. In order to inform the discussion about juvenile appeals,
I conducted empirical research by surveying the director of every states'
administrative office of the courts, including the District of Columbia. 281
The data set includes the results of this study from the fourteen states
that were able to provide information allowing for the determination of
an approximate rate of appeals filed.282 Thirty-eight states, as well as the
District of Columbia, responded in some fashion. 283 Twenty-five of
277. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE
COURT CASELOADS 51 (2010), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/-/media/
Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx.
278. See 2007 DOJ REPORT, supra note 257, at 1. This number remained steady between 2000
and 2007. Id.
279. SARA HOCKENBERRY, MELISSA SICKMUND & ANTHONY SLADKY, U.S. DEP'T OF; JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
CENSUS, 2008: SELECTED FINDINGS 2 (2011), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffileslojjdp/231683.
pdf.
280. SARA HOCKENBERRY, MELISSA SICKMUND & ANTHONY SLADKY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
CENSUS, 2006: SELECTED FINDINGS 5 (2009), available at www.ncjs.gov/pdffileslojjdp/
228128.pdf.
281. The data included here is a result of statistical information based upon a survey sent to all
states requesting data that included: 1) the number of incoming delinquency cases filed; 2) the
number of cases resolved by a final appealable order; 3) the number of youth committed to a
detention facility or other residential placement; 4) the number of juvenile delinquency appeals
actually filed with intermediate appellate courts; 5) the outcome on appeal; 6) the number of
juvenile delinquency appeals resolved via written opinion if available; and 7) whether the
jurisdiction precludes a juvenile's appeal of pretrial rulings after a plea is entered in delinquency
cases. This article utilizes the data, where available, derived from responses submitted to
questions 1, 2, and 4.
282. See infra Table I for a listing of the fourteen states providing sufficient data.
283. An additional twenty-five states (and the District of Columbia) responded; respondents
indicating they could not provide the data or did not follow up with appellate data were: Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, North Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, South Dakota, and the District of Columbia.
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those states responded without appellate data, and some expressed that
they would be unable to provide any of the requested information.
The number of juvenile delinquency appeals and the rate at which
they are filed in a given state is difficult to obtain. In order to form an
approximate number of the rate of appeals by defendants, the request
included the number of final appealable orders (i.e., adjudications of
guilt) and the number of actual appeals filed. State jurisdictions track
cases and capture data in a variety of ways. As one example, North
Carolina records each individual count in a delinquency complaint as a
separate "case" in their data system.2 84 The most common data gap is
that many states do not independently record the number of juvenile
delinquency appeals filed. Rather, they are grouped together with other
types of juvenile cases, such as child abuse and neglect. 28 As a result,
annual court reports providing appellate and other case statistics do not
report the number of juvenile delinquency appeals separately. In fact, a
review of numerous state court reports available online revealed that
only Minnesota specifically designates the number of delinquency
appeals filed with its Court of Appeals in its annual report.28 6
In response to the data request sent to each state, fourteen states
were able to provide data allowing for determination of the rates of
appeals. Limitations include self-selection with regard to survey
responses and the inability to track specific outcomes on a case-by-case
basis as was performed in the Harris study.2 87 For example, some cases
may be filed in 2006 with an appeal filed in 2007. But overall, the data
284. E-mail from Megan Wilson, N.C. Data Analyst, to author (Aug. 28, 2011) (on file with
author).
285. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEVADA JUDICIARY:
FISCAL YEAR 2009 24 (2009), available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/view
documentsandforms/func-startdown/2896/ (reporting that juvenile and family cases account for
five percent of the Supreme Court caseload); SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, ANNUAL REPORT 2010
28 (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/annual-reports/annual
report2010.pdf (reporting that juvenile, domestic, and probate cases account for approximately
four percent of the Ohio Courts of Appeal caseload); NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY 2001-2002 15 (reporting that the Family Division accounted for
thirty-nine percent of the filings the Appellate Division of the Superior Court received).
286. See MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, MINNESOTA COURT ANNUAL REPORT OF 2008, 1, 16
(2009), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_InformationOffice/
AR_.Working_08.pdf (reporting the number of juvenile delinquency appeals filed in 2008 but not
the number of juvenile delinquency filings). The number of delinquency filings for 2008 were
accessed separately in Minnesota Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee, Annual Report and
Recommendations to the Minnesota Governor and State Legislature, 25 (2010), available at
https://dps.mn.gov/entity/jjac/Documents/2010_JJACReport.pdf. Minnesota did not provide the
data in response to the survey for the years requested, so it is not included in the reporting data.
287. See Harris, supra note 20, at 209-10, 220, 223; Drizin & Luloff, supra note 12; Fedders,
supra note 70; Feld, supra note 92; Redding, supra note 92; and accompanying text for discussion
on the methods used in Harris' study of Pennsylvania data from 1990.
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provides an effective starting point in the discussion about the reliability
of these case outcomes and provides a broader data set than has been
available previously.
A final judgment, whether by plea or trial, is generally required
before an appeal may be taken of issues, such as suppression. 88 There-
fore, a juvenile who loses a critical suppression hearing, for example,
would make a conditional plea before appealing the suppression ruling.
In some instances, such as Colorado, the entry of pleas is not conditional
and appeals are permitted prior to plea for pretrial rulings.289 But even
where pleas are not conditional, they do not preclude a challenge based
on the validity of the plea.2 90
Table I illustrates data which includes the average annual numbers
for four years, from 2007 through 2010, unless otherwise indicated.
TABLE 1. AVERAGE RATES OF APPEAL IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CASES FROM 2007-2010
Average Delinquency Average Number Rate of
States Avae ed inqncy of Annual Appeal
States Cas s Filed Findings Appeals Filed
Florida* 57605 35139± 587 0.0167
Maryland* 17465 4179 47 0.0113
Washington 19104 10889 107 0.0098
Oregon 5285 4030 29 0.0072
Alaska 884 444 2.6 0.0058
Vermont 853 394 1.44 0.0036
Idaho 14046 8568± 28 0.0032
Colorado 12212 7449± 22.6 0.0030
Wisconsin 9070 5532± 20.2 0.0036
288. See HERTZ, GUGGENHEIM & AMSTERDAM, supra note 70, at 281 (explaining that in some
jurisdictions the entry of a guilty plea waives all right to appellate review of errors committed
prior to the plea but that an increasing number of jurisdictions authorize appellate review of
pretrial suppression rulings after the entry of a guilty plea); see, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 330.2(6) (McKinney 1985) (describing that a suppression motion is not precluded by the entry
of an admission and may be reviewed after an ensuing finding of delinquency).
289. People v. Neuhaus, 240 P.3d 391, 397-98 (Colo. App. 2009). In addition, Georgia
allowed conditional pleas by case law but then reversed the decision three years later. Mims v.
State, 410 S.E.2d 824, 825-26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (authorizing conditional guilty pleas from
different kinds of court rulings and setting forth procedures), abrogated by Hooten v. State, 442
S.E.2d 836, 837-41 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that conditional guilty pleas would no longer be
authorized).
290. See, e.g., Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of
the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 877-78 (2010) (describing case law establishing the
types of claims that survive a non conditional guilty plea, such as ineffective assistance of counsel
and sentencing issues that arise after a plea).
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Texas* 29376 19306 52 0.0026
New Jersey 38176 25577 43.5 0.0017
Alabama 30198 14077 23.25 0.0016
Utah 27,604 16,838± 11 0.00066
Rhode Island 5776 4404± 1.25 0.00028
Average Rate of Appeal 1 1 0.0051
*Data for Florida and Texas is from 2010; Maryland's data is for 3 years, 2008 to 2010.
±Indicates states that state reported the total number of cases filed and the number of
appeals but was unable to report the number of juvenile delinquency findings that resulted
in final appealable orders. On average, the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that in
2008, the most recent year the statistic is available, 61% of total cases filed resulted in
findings of juvenile delinquency. 29 1 Therefore, the number of appealable orders in these
states is derived by using the federal government's estimated percentage.
The study revealed that juvenile delinquency appeals are taken, on
average, at a rate of 5.1 per 1,000 cases where a juvenile was adjudi-
cated delinquent292 Six of the states that responded to the survey are
among the top seventeen states in terms of the numbers of youth who are
living in confinement.2 93 For example, Texas is second only to Califor-
nia294 for the number children living in detention. In Texas, there were
fifty-two delinquency appeals filed in the entire state in 2010, at a rate of
2.6 per 1,000 total guilty adjudications.
Florida had the highest appellate rate of any reporting state, with
close to a 2% rate of appeals. Rhode Island and Utah reported the lowest
appellate rates, with less than one appeal per 3,000 cases in Rhode
Island and less than one appeal per 2,000 cases in Utah (6.6 per 10,000).
The National Juvenile Defender Center Report assessing access to coun-
sel and quality of representation in juvenile delinquency proceedings in
Florida in 2006 described the appellate practice among defenders. 2 9 5
291. Charles Puzzanchera, et al., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,, JUVENILE COURT
STATISTIcs 2008, 1, 45 (2011), available at http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2008.pdf.
292. The average rate of appeal was 5.1 appeals per 1000 cases where a child was found
delinquent. (Data on file with author).
293. Kids Count Data Center: Persons Residing in Juvenile Detention and Correctional
Facilities by Age Group (Number) - 2006, Annie E. Casey Found., http://datacenter.kidscount.
org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?order-D&loct=2&dtm=319&by=v&tf=I 7&ind=42&ch=a&
sortid=1 13 (last updated June 2008) [hereinafter Kids Count Data Center]. That includes Texas
(second), Florida (third), Colorado (twelfth), Alabama (thirteenth), New Jersey (fifteenth), and
Washington (seventeenth). In addition, according to the National Center for Juvenile Justice, 25%
of juveniles adjudicated delinquent are placed outside of the home. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA,
BENJAMIN ADAMS & MELISSA SIcioMuND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT
STATISTIcs 2006-2007 1, 59 (2010), available at http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/jcsreports/jcs2007.pdf.
Accordingly, utilizing the federal government's 25% estimate for the rate of placement, the rate of
appeal for cases resulting in out-of-home placement pursuant to the data of the author's study
would be just less than 2.5%.
294. See Kids Count Data Center, supra note 293.
295. PuRrTZ & CRAwFoRD, supra note 3, at 48.
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Although it observed that appeals were lacking, the report concluded
that there was evidence of an awareness of the importance of appeals. 296
While the appellate rate remains low in Florida at 2%, the state's prac-
tices warrant further exploration given that it is substantially higher than
the rate in other states. Indeed, according to the data, appeals are filed at
approximately 3.5 times the rate of other states. The appellate rate-
even hovering at 2%-appears to significantly enhance the development
of case law. Nearly 15% of juvenile delinquency opinions available
nationally over the past ten years were generated out of Florida appellate
courts .298
There is an intuitive association between lack of appellate practice
and high rates of waiver of counsel in juvenile cases; without counsel, it
is reasonable to assume that it is difficult for juveniles to file appeals and
that frequent waivers of counsel account for low numbers of appeals. A
comparison of states based on the data, however, suggests that reasons
for the lack of appeals are more complex and are not fully explained by
presence or absence of counsel. For example, Texas does not permit
juveniles to waive the right to counsel in most instances, 2 9 9 and yet the
appellate rate remains slightly less than three appeals per 1,000 cases.
This suggests that other factors contribute to the lack of appeals and
requires further exploration. This is also troubling given that Texas has
the second highest number of juveniles in juvenile detention and correc-
tional facilities in the country." New Jersey also has strong protections
against waiver of counsel by youth, and, yet, its appellate rate of 1.7
appeals per 1,000 cases resulting a juvenile delinquency findings is the
same as Alabama, which provides no additional provisions against juve-
296. Id. The prosecution appears to actively file appeals there, which may contribute in part to
the difference. See PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 48. The Florida Assessment report cites
one conversation where investigators learned appeals were "rare and usually taken by the State."
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is in contrast to studies indicating
that 95% of appeals are taken by defendants. See 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. For the
applicable statute, see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.145(c) (iterating the appeals that may be taken by the state
in juvenile delinquency cases, including dismissals of any part of a delinquency petition if the
order is entered before commencement of a hearing, suppression rulings, and disposition
decisions).
297. Florida's appellate rate is nearly 2 percent at 0.0167 and is approximately 3.5 times the
rate of the national average found at 0.0051. See infra Table 1. While nationally, close to 5 cases
out of 1,000 are appealed, Florida's rate equals nearly 17 appeals per 1,000. Id.
298. See infra Part W.A.
299. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09 (West 1997) (permitting waiver of the right to counsel by
children). But see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §51.10(b) (preventing waiver in transfer hearings to
criminal court, adjudication and dispositions hearings, and hearings prior to commitment to the
Texas Youth Commission for disposition modification).
300. According to U.S. Census Data, Texas had 8247 youth incarcerated, second only to
California and accounting for nearly 9% of the total number of juveniles in detention nationally.
Kids Count Data Center, supra note 293.
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nile waiver of counsel. In Wisconsin, a state with a similar rate of
appeals as that of Texas, juveniles below fifteen may not waive the right
to counsel.3 01 Utah, with one of the lowest appellate rates reported, has a
statute which presumes that children who are age fourteen and older are
competent to waive their right to counsel without a parent or attorney
present.302
In the Florida juvenile defender assessment, observers also noted
inappropriate and high rates of waiver of counsel. 03 After 2008, how-
ever, the state codified the juvenile's right to consult with counsel before
the juvenile will be permitted to waive the right to counsel.3 04 For a
juvenile's waiver of counsel to be valid, the juvenile's counsel, parent,
custodian, or relative must attest that the juvenile's waiver was knowing
and voluntary. 05
In addition, it appears that even where, as in Utah, the right to
appeal is a state constitutional right, 0 6 the source of the right has little
impact on access to appeals. In Utah, despite the constitutional right to
appeal for juveniles, the appellate rate is less than one appeal per 2,000
appealable orders in delinquency cases. Not surprisingly, as a result,
there is also little case law there discussing the application of criminal
law and procedure to juveniles within the state. Only twelve juvenile
delinquency appellate opinions are publicly available over ten years
between 2001 and 2011.307
Without a "model state" to look to, it is difficult to identify a suc-
cessful set of rules and how much of a difference preclusion of waiver
alone makes on access to appeals. The documentation of the lack of
appellate process in juvenile justice raises numerous questions but can
also inform the discussion going forward. In addition to the risks created
by less opportunity for error correction, fewer appeals result in an under-
developed body of law to guide adjudication of cases. What rights suffer
as a result? How does the infrequency of appeals affect the court's abil-
ity to provide guidance to the community and law enforcement? How
does the lack of guidance and review affect minority populations and
efforts to reduce disproportionate minority confinement? The lack of
301. Wis. STAT. § 938.23(lm) (2009).
302. UTAH JUv. P. R. 26(e).
303. PuRrrz & CRAwFoRD, supra note 3, at 2. Although recently, the law was changed to
provide more protections against waiver. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
304. FLA. R. Juv. P. R. 8.165(a).
305. FLA. R. Juv. P. R. 8.165(b)(3).
306. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (providing that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause").
307. The search was conducted on Westlaw in Utah State Court opinions using the terms
"su(juvenile & delinquen! & appeal!)" between July 29, 2001 and July 28, 2011.
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appeals raises concerns about the wisdom of policies utilizing juvenile
adjudications in the same way that adult convictions are used.
IV. APPELLATE OPINIONS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES
Appellate opinions play a critical role in the public's understanding,
and, to a large extent, scholarly analysis of the law."os Case opinions are
"the cases that provide the reasoning available to courts and litigants that
rest at the heart of a common law system."309 Although commentators
disagree about "the proper scope of courts' rights-making activities, they
do not dispute the value of the basic rights-making function."3 10
While an analysis that is limited to written opinions is different
from looking at all appeals resolved, written opinions provide insight
into the development of the law. In the criminal and juvenile context,
they inform and guide law enforcement interactions with the public.
Interactions with juveniles may differ based upon considerations of
developmental maturity and age and, therefore, necessitate case law dic-
tating the contours of these principles. In addition, there are unique pro-
cedural issues that arise in juvenile court that are different from criminal
court and require statutory interpretation. Some examples are the stan-
dard for a juvenile waiver of counsel, the use of conditional pleas, statu-
tory interpretations related to transfer hearings to adult court, and the
application of the validity of guilty pleas in the absence of advice about
collateral consequences.
Courts have recognized the difference between police interactions
with juveniles versus adults3 1I and the difference in applying punish-
ment to juveniles, 1 2 principles that are constantly evolving with societal
understanding of adolescence. Given that cases resolved with judicial
opinions are the cases that "announce and influence legal doctrine,"3 13 it
follows that their examination is critical. Therefore, the next portion of
this appellate analysis examines the characteristics of publicly available
opinions using Westlaw's online legal database. The characteristics
examined include geography and bases of appeal.
308. Heise, supra note 23, at 827.
309. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State
Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1451, 1465 (2009); see
also Ortbals, supra note 89, at 105 ("Many juvenile court judges would welcome some guides to
follow, and the best means of supplying standards to insure [sic] uniformity of practices is an
appellate court decision on the matter.").
310. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 405, 411(discussing the law-making
function of appellate courts as proper and desirable).
311. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
312. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
553 (2005); see also infra Part IV.B.1-2.
313. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 309, at 1465.
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A. Frequency and Distribution of Opinions
This section provides unique data about juvenile delinquency
appellate opinions nationally over ten years, from 2001 through 2011.
The number of juvenile delinquency appellate opinions available during
this ten-year period was 3,426. 1 Almost half of these opinions are from
only three states: Florida, Ohio, and New York.315 In fact, New York
appellate court opinions accounted for 20% of the total delinquency
opinions available nationally in the ten-year period and Ohio and Florida
account for nearly 15% each.3 16 For Florida, the high number corre-
sponds with the higher rate of appeals filed, as evidenced by Florida's
appellate statistical data that was provided for this study. New York and
Ohio were not able to provide the information for the study but the vol-
ume of opinions reasonably suggests a more active appellate practice. In
addition, the sheer volume of cases in those three states is significant;
they are also three of the top six states with the highest numbers of
juveniles residing in detention facilities, which likely contributes to the
higher number of appeals taken.3 " Given the low appellate rate and the
fact that not all cases result in opinions, few written decisions are issued
in the delinquency context in a given state per year.
B. Bases of Appeal
There is little information about the most common bases of appeal
in juvenile delinquency cases, though it is logical that the patterns would
follow adult criminal cases absent jury instruction issues and specific
sentencing guideline errors. Suppression issues are among the most
common bases of appeal in criminal appeals.3 1  The development of
criminal procedural jurisprudence and its application toward juveniles
are a central focus of this article. Therefore, the opinions available in the
314. This search was performed on Westlaw by searching the case summary using the terms
"SU (juvenile & delinquen! & appeal!)" between July 29, 2001 and July 28, 2011.
315. This search was performed on Westlaw by searching the case summary using the terms
"SU (juvenile & delinquen! & appeal!)" for cases between July 29, 2001 and July 28, 2011 and
then searching within those results using the terms "CO (FL OH NY)" which resulted in 1,623
cases.
316. This search was performed on Westlaw by searching the case summary using the terms
"SU (juvenile & delinquen! & appeal!)" for cases between July 29, 2001 and July 28, 2011 and
then searching within those results using the terms "CO (NY)" which resulted in 722 cases.
317. See Kids Count Data Center, supra note 293. However, California and Texas, the two
leading states in numbers of confined youth, account for significantly lower numbers of opinions
available than do New York, Florida and Ohio as measured using the technique described in note
273.
318. CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 131, at 1, 15-17 (studying issues raised in the first level
of appeal by sampling five different geographically diverse state courts of appeal). Jury
instructions were raised in 30% of adult criminal cases but are largely inapplicable in the juvenile
delinquency context. Id. at 4.
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review of appellate decisions were searched for suppression issues aris-
ing from searches and confessions, along with challenges to disposi-
tional orders.
1. FIFTH AMENDMENT
Within the universe of cases analyzed, about 9% of the cases con-
tained discussion about Fifth Amendment issues or referenced
Miranda."' This included explorations unique to juveniles, such as the
role of age in the court's analysis related to custodial interrogation,3 20
the test for whether a school official acts as an agent of law enforcement
for questioning purposes,32' and whether or not the right to protect
against self-incrimination applies to the dispositional phase of a delin-
quency proceeding.32 2 Indeed, the most significant decision addressing
juveniles and Miranda during this time period reached the Supreme
Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.3 23 The case addressed the role of a
child's age in a court's determination about when there is custodial
interrogation triggering the necessity of Miranda warnings. 324 The issue
before the Court was whether police questioning of a thirteen-year-old
boy at school was a custodial interrogation that should have triggered
Miranda warnings.325 The Court reversed the North Carolina Supreme
Court's holding that age was not a permissible factor in custodial analy-
sis under Miranda.32 6 In doing so, it held that age is a permissible factor:
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to
police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would
feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to
blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's
age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.32 7
The case has significant import in a formerly unclear area of law. It
involved a scenario that plays out with frequent occurrence: Everyday,
police encounter and question children, whether at school, on the street,
319. The author of this article searched using the terms ("Fifth Amendment" Miranda
"U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5."). The search resulted in 310 cases out of 3426.
320. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402-03 (2011).
321. See, e.g., In re T.A.G., 663 S.E.2d 392, 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that school
official was acting as an agent of police where administrator testified about her conferrals with
police authorities about what questions to ask or what information she "missed" in her own
questioning of the student).
322. K.C. v. State (In re K.C.), 257 P.3d 23, 27 (Wyo. 2011) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply to the dispositional phase of a
delinquency proceeding).
323. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
324. Id. at 2398.
325. Id. at 2398-99.
326. Id. at 2408.
327. Id. at 2398-99.
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or at the police station-sometimes with a parent present, but often
without. Courts already consider the age of the interviewee when deter-
mining whether waiver of Miranda rights is "knowing, intelligent and
voluntary" under the totality of circumstances analysis.32 8 Prior to
J.D.B., however, it was less clear what role age plays in the preliminary
analysis about whether an interrogation was custodial, thereby triggering
Miranda rights.
The case illustrates the implications resulting from lack of appeals
and case law, as many states did not have relevant case law about the
role of age in the courts' custodial analysis related to Miranda rights.
The State of North Carolina and its amici, which included thirty states'
attorneys general, argued that a child's age is not relevant to the custody
analysis, no matter how young the child.3 29 The National Association of
District Attorneys was also among the amici for the state.3 3 o The Court
was closely divided in its opinion by a vote of five to four; however, the
majority opinion was forceful in its conclusion that "in many cases
involving juvenile suspects, the custody analysis would be nonsensical
absent some consideration of the suspect's age."33
Previously, seven state courts had refused to consider age as rele-
vant to the custodial inquiry.332 Three state courts previously deemed
age a relevant factor to the custodial inquiry. 3 Twenty states had no
pertinent case law cited by either party or amici as relevant to the
issue.334 Some state courts may be silent on the issue due to the procedu-
328. Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
329. Id. at 2402, 2406 (noting that the State of North Carolina and its amici argued that age
was not relevant to the custodial analysis at issue). For the list of states' attorneys general included
in one amicus brief in support of the respondent, see Brief of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121).
330. Brief of the National District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121).
331. Id. at 2405.
332. State v. Turner, 838 A.2d 947, 963 (Conn. 2004); In re J.F., 987 A.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C.
2010) (declining to consider the juvenile's age); People v. Croom, 883 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) ("Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on objectiveness, we decline to consider
defendant's age when determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes."); State v.
Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 681-82 n.1 (Iowa 2009); State v. Morton, 186 P.3d 785, 794 (Kan.
2008); In re W.B. II, No. 08CA18, 2009 WL 961500, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App., Mar. 27, 2009); CSC
v. State (In re CSC), 118 P.3d 970, 977-78 (Wyo. 2005).
333. See, e.g., In re Jorge D., 43 P.3d 605, 608-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Howard,
92 P.3d 445, 450 (Colo. 2004) (en banc); In re Joshua David C., 698 A.2d 1155, 1162 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1997).
334. A review of all briefs available on Westlaw that were filed with the Supreme Court in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina did not reveal additional case law. For examples of the briefs searched
by the author, see Brief for Petitioner, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-
11121); Brief for the Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121) 2011 WL 439564; Brief
of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct.
2394 (No. 09-11121); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of
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ral norms or statutes within the state that already provide greater protec-
tions for juveniles against coerced confessions.3 3  For the most part,
however, the lack of clarity and discussion about the relevance of age in
the custodial analysis provides an example of the lack of judicial oppor-
tunity to refine the rights of juveniles through appellate discussion.
Without this opportunity, there is a lack of guidance available for law
enforcement, trial courts, prosecutors, and defenders representing
juveniles.
2. FOURTH AMENDMENT
Search and seizure issues are among the more common issues
raised and litigated in criminal appeals.336 Within the database of cases
at issue in the previous ten years in the juvenile delinquency context,
however, only about 6% included discussion of Fourth Amendment
issues. 3 This small group of opinions over the past ten years demon-
strates how fact patterns involving juveniles' constitutional rights bene-
fit from judicial discussion in this criminal procedural context. Fourth
Amendment law is uniquely fact-specific. 338 Therefore, in the juvenile
context, it is necessary for courts to discuss and consider the effects of
age, prior experience with the law, and tendency to acquiesce to author-
ity to determine whether the child gave consent to search. The effect of
age on consent to search is an underdeveloped area of law, 339 and with-
out appeals to test or explain it, it may remain as such. This inevitably
impedes transfer of knowledge about juvenile decision-making and ado-
Petitioner, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121); Brief of Center on Wrongful Convictions of
Youth, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121);
Brief of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-
11121); Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, J.D.B., 131
S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121); Brief of the National District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121).
335. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32/A-2-
14(E) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-2(1) (West 2007) (providing that any statements
made to police by children under the age of fourteen, independent of custodial considerations,
may not be used against them).
336. Gregory D. Totten, Peter D. Kossoris & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Exclusionary Rule: Fix It,
But Fix it Right: A Critique of If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 26
PEPP. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (1999).
337. 224 cases resulted from a search within 3,426 juvenile delinquency appeals cases using
the terms "U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4."
338. See Kerr, supra note 26, at 237 ("The course of Fourth Amendment law slowly develops
through the process of case-by-case adjudication.").
339. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 133 (2009) ("[Wlhile age clearly matters to assertion of Fourth
Amendment rights . . ., courts have yet to reach any consensus over how this is so, and tend to use
adult-like tests despite brief nods to the impact of youth.").
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lescent development into a well-developed body of law.3 40 It follows
that juveniles' rights are impeded by this lack of development.3 4 1 Other
Fourth Amendment issues beyond the question about whether there was
consent to search also arise in the juvenile context.34 2
While age is a permissible factor for courts to consider under the
totality of the circumstances about whether a child gave consent to
search,343 the role or weight that courts give to a young person's age
lacks uniform application. In the appellate opinions where the Fourth
Amendment gave rise to a challenge pertaining to juvenile defendants in
this study, specific issues related to the age and status as a minor were
pertinent, and, at times, critical. In the instances where courts confronted
relevant suppression motions, some courts provided guidance and dis-
cussion. * Age was, at times, a deciding factor with regard to consent.
340. Id.
341. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 358 MTim. L. REV.
349, 394 (1974) ("If there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not
do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable.").
342. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vanya V., 914 N.E.2d 339, 344-45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009)
(Berry, J., concurring) (holding that the search of a juvenile's bag was not a legitimate inventory
search where the police department's policy was insufficiently precise); State ex rel. R.M., 974
A.2d 1110, 1113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (upholding search of minor as a valid search
incident to arrest where the police officer observed him with a friend out in public after
established juvenile curfew and the child said he did not have identification).
343. In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 502 (D.C. 1992) (en banc).
344. See, e.g., In re Daijah D., 927 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (reversing
and dismissing petition holding that fourteen-year-old girl did not legally consent to search of her
purse when she was stopped and confronted by four police officers and was not informed she had
the right to say no to the search even though she unequivocally gave her purse to the officer). The
Daijah court noted that age and prior experience with the law was a necessary factor in whether
the child gave consent to the search. Id. See also E.J. v. State, 40 So. 3d 922, 923-24 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (reversing trial court that failed to discuss age, prior experience with the law, and
the fact that the child did not know that she could refuse a search in considering constitutionality
of a search and whether child consented); In re I.R.T., 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(acknowledging that in the Fourth Amendment context "[tihere has not been an explicit holding
by the courts of this state as to whether the age of a defendant or juvenile is a relevant inquiry in
determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave" and holding that the age of a
juvenile is a relevant factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred). For other scenarios
related to juvenile status, see State v. Aaron R., No. 29,001, 2010 WL 3969604, at *6 (N.M. Ct.
App. Jan. 19, 2010) (reasonable suspicion was created where child ran away from a police officer
on a school day during school hours and refused an order to stop where officer was investigating a
911 call for a robbery in the vicinity); State v. Gage R., 243 P.3d 453, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010)
(reversing the trial court and holding that individualized suspicion was required in order to justify
school security officer's search of juvenile's backpack). In Gage R., the mere presence of a
juvenile in an area where "everyone hangs out to smoke" outside a school campus, absent a reason
to suspect that any particular student was in possession of contraband, did not give rise to a
constitutionally sound search. Id. Related to minor status, where a juvenile consented to a search
of his car but indicated that "only his mother had a key to the console," an appellate court held
that search of the console was unlawful. J.J.V. v. State, 17 So. 3d. 881, 885-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009). The court ruled that the statement by the juvenile about his mother as the proprietor
of the key showed that he was "at least reluctant, if not unwilling" to consent to a search of the
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Consider a state court's analysis determining that a fourteen-year-old did
not give legal consent to the search of her purse even where there was no
factual dispute concerning her actions in handing her purse to the
police. 45 In contrast, in other cases, the effect of age was largely
ignored and the court applied the same standard that is applied to
adults.34 6 The role of age in judicial analysis continues to vary across
states and even within them.34 7
In addition, more than a quarter of the Fourth Amendment cases
included search issues mentioning schools. Courts continue to discuss
and apply the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v.
T.L.0 3 48 that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school offi-
cials. 349 Those searches must be justified at inception but can be based
upon a "reasonableness" standard rather than the probable cause stan-
dard, leaving many issues for state courts to resolve.350 State courts have
considered whether individual state constitutions provide a broader level
of protection to students"' and have applied different factors to deter-
locked area. Id. at 885; see also State v. Doe, 233 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the
trial court's attempt to require parental submission to urine testing as part of juvenile's probation
was a violation of the parent's Fourth Amendment right).
345. See Daijah D., 927 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
346. See, e.g., In re D.H., 673 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Ga. 2009) (upholding consent based upon a
reasonable person standard where two officers approached two fifteen-year-old juveniles after
receiving a tip related to drug activity and requested to search their pockets). The D.H. court did
not discuss the effect of age or prior experience with police in determining that it was a lawful
"first-tier consensual encounter." Id. at 193. See also State v. R.H., 900 So. 2d 689, 691-92 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing suppression of drugs found on juvenile and holding that consent
was valid and encounter with officers was consensual where juvenile was approached by two
officers at 1:00 a.m. in a parking lot "notorious" for narcotic and other crimes with no discussion
of age). The R.H. court drew upon case law discussing police encounters with adults and made no
reference to the precise age of the minor, only that he appeared to be sixteen to eighteen to the
officer upon her approach. Id. at 691.
347. Compare E.J. v. State, 40 So. 3d 922, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing trial court
that failed to discuss age, prior experience with the law, and the fact that the child did not know
that she could refuse a search in considering constitutionality of a search and whether child
consented), with I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming denial
of suppression motion where juvenile was removed from classroom by police deputy and asked to
consent to search of his bag after being informed that he was under suspicion for possession of
marijuana). The I.R.C. court made no mention of the juvenile's age and gave little significance to
his testimony that he did not know that he could refuse the search. I.R.C., 968 So. 2d at 587. The
court also indicated that the defendant failed to overtly argue that his age played a role. Id.; see
also State v. A.L., 956 So. 2d 1215, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing suppression based
upon consent with no discussion of role of age in voluntariness).
348. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
349. Id. at 333.
350. Id. at 341-42.
351. See, e.g., State ex rel Juvenile Dep't v. M.A.D., 233 P.3d 437, 444-45 (Or. 2010) (en
banc) (affirming the instant search but declining to extend the T.L.O. standard and suggesting that
reasonable suspicion alone without "specific articulable facts" may not meet the permissible
threshold for a search by school officials under Article 1, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution).
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mine whether a search was, in fact, based upon reasonable suspicion or
justified at its inception.35 2 Where school officials act in conjunction
with police officials, courts must determine a police officer's level of
involvement with the search to decide whether the more lenient reasona-
bleness standard versus probable cause applies.353 Next, the court must
determine whether the search was conducted in a proper manner.35 4
Common fact patterns also tend to repeat themselves, revealing law
enforcement tendencies to develop suspicion toward juveniles related to
affiliation with other juveniles or presence in groups,355 provoke ques-
tions about being out late at night, or prompt other civil violations.
These scenarios present common questions about how police can legally
interact with and engage juveniles. Where officers handcuffed and sub-
sequently performed a pat-down of a teenager who was walking with
another teenager while the other teen smoked marijuana, the court held
But see In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 350-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (fully adopting the T.L.O.
reasonableness standard for search by school officials without distinction).
352. See, e.g., In re Juvenile 2006-406, 931 A.2d 1229, 1234 (N.H. 2007) ("[T]he
development of the factual record in this case demonstrates to us the need to provide further
guidance regarding the factors that both school administrators and trial courts should consider to
determine whether a search of a student is justified at its inception.... Courts around the country
have adopted various sets of factors."). The Juvenile court acknowledged its adoption of Florida's
list of factors. Id.; see also D.G. v. State, 961 So. 2d 1063, 1064-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding reasonable suspicion where vice principal's search was based upon statement by another
student that juvenile "may have been in possession of marijuana" even though student had made
an incorrect accusation in the past; that fact was not enough to "rebut the presumption of
reliability"); In re K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 305-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing trial court and
requiring suppression where school official searched student's shorts based upon an anonymous
tip that student had drugs in his underwear).
353. See, e.g., People v. K.S. (In re K.S.), 183 Cal. App. 4th 72, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming trial court's conclusion that T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard applied to vice principal's
warrantless search of student's locker); R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tenn. 2008) ("The
issue of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion should be applied to law enforcement
officers conducting a search of a student in a school setting is a matter of first impression in
Tennessee.").
354. See, e.g., In re Elvin G., 910 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 2009) (remanding due to insufficient
record to determine whether a search occurred where juvenile claimed that principal asked all
students to stand and empty their pockets).
355. See, e.g., People v. Antonio B. (In re Antonio B.), 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 698 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that the handcuffing of the juvenile resulted in an illegal arrest and
involuntary search where action was done solely based upon action of friend); see also R.W. v.
State, 913 So. 2d 505, 513 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming denial of suppression and noting
that when police responded to 911 call that "[a~ll of the [young] men, including R.W., were
fidgeting and appeared nervous, and R.W., at one point, had his hands inside his shirt"); In re
K.P., 951 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C. 2008) (rejecting the argument by the government that even if
police did not have a justification to stop the defendant, the police were justified in stopping the
group of juveniles "either [as] participants in the [threats] or [as] witnesses to it who could
provide material information about the event and the . . . identity of the [perpetrator]" (quoting
Williamson v. United States, 607 A.2d 471, 476 (D.C. 1992))) (internal quotation marks omitted);
People v. Mario T. (In re Mario T.), 875 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (police search of
juvenile based upon fear for safety after encountering four males required suppression).
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that the search was unlawful.35 6 In addition, a Florida appellate court
reversed the search of a teenager who was in a parked car at 4:30 a.m. in
a high crime area, concluding that being out late at night, by itself, does
not warrant reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."' In some
instances, the appellate court noted the dramatic level of error. In its
reversal of a lower court's failure to suppress evidence based upon a
search of a fourteen-year-old passenger in a car, a Florida appellate court
stated, "[t]hat the court erred in [failing to suppress] was most likely not
lost on the state, which did not argue otherwise in its brief."3 5  Another
decision was reversed where the trial court failed to suppress the fruits
of a search following the stop and arrest of a juvenile for smoking a
cigarette.3 59 Additionally, in at least some instances, courts acknowl-
edged the need to independently analyze state constitutional
provisions.360
3. DISPOSITION
In order to most accurately measure the prevalence of challenges to
dispositional decisions, opinions throughout a one-year time period were
searched manually to determine how many dispositions were specifi-
cally challenged and the success rate of those challenges. 36 1 There were
278 juvenile delinquency opinions in total for July 2010-2011; about
12%, or thirty-two of those opinions, described a challenge that was spe-
cific to the disposition that the court ordered in the case.36 2 Nine cases-
nearly one-third-were opinions issued by New York appellate courts.
Forty percent, or thirteen cases, were reversed at least in-part and
remanded. Reversals included judges overstepping authority, displaying
356. Antonio B., 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 698.
357. T.R.T. v. State, 982 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
358. E.J. v. State, 40 So. 3d 922, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
359. In re Calvin S., 930 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
360. A.M. v. State, 891 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding search but also
discussing the need to conduct a dual analysis under the Fourth Amendment and Indiana's
Constitution because Section 11 [of the Indiana Constitution's] purpose is to "protect from
unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
361. Because it is difficult to isolate challenges to the actual disposition given the frequency
with which the term "disposition" appears in opinions, the author searched for juvenile
delinquency appeals between July 29, 2010 and July 28, 2011, located "disposition" within the
search, and then read the 192 cases to determine which ones included challenges to the actual
disposition.
362. See, e.g., In re Akilino R., 921 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (upholding trial
court's order of probation at disposition); In re Anthony N., 921 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011) (upholding the trial court's imposition of a conditional discharge instead of an adjournment
in contemplation of dismissal); In re Tafari S., 922 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(affirming lower court's order of confinement); In re A.O., 342 S.W.3d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (affirming order of confinement to the Texas Youth Commission).
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bias, improperly applying statutory provisions, and failing to articulate
reasons for more restrictive placements or probation terms.36 3
The review of appellate delinquency opinions issued in any given
year reveals that there are comparatively few written appellate state
court opinions available. This is consistent with the survey data reflect-
ing appellate filings. With so few appeals filed, states should question
the reliability and accuracy of juvenile adjudications. In addition, with
little guidance available to courts and law enforcement, current juvenile
courts are not well positioned to further develop the law.
V. THE APPELLATE ROLE GOING FORWARD
There is increased public recognition that appellate courts must
play a greater role in policing the accuracy of criminal trials. * Despite
the importance of appeals in general, and, specifically, in the criminal
context, there have been "few systematic efforts to examine case
processing in state appellate courts,"3 6 and even less effort targeted
towards assessing juvenile delinquency appeals. The rate of appeals
culled from states' responses raises potential questions about the relia-
bility of adjudications, the quality of representation, the quality and fair-
ness of case-processing, and whether a system lacking in accountability
for decision-making can really achieve its goals to reduce disproportion-
ate treatment of minority youth. States should take steps to change that.
A. Collection of Data
State judicial branches should collect more robust data in juvenile
delinquency cases including, but not limited to, the quantity and basis of
appeals, in order to fully assess the juvenile right to appeal in their own
jurisdictions. Where the scope of the appellate deficit is unknown, it is
more difficult to identify the factors that correlate with the lack of
appeals, to confirm the possible causes, and, finally, to understand the
depth of the consequences of the lack of appeals. Furthermore, beyond
the numbers of appeals taken, some states replied to this study indicating
363. See, e.g., State ex rel. S.M., 67 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing
dispositional order); State ex rel. B.T., 67 So. 3d 693, 694-95 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (amending
adjudication of delinquency where court improperly considered a juvenile adjudication as a
"conviction," which would have required confinement); In re Kyle FF., 85 A.D.3d 1463, 1463-64
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (reversing trial court's disposition ordering probation where the parties
agreed to placement in foster care and court independently called probation officer as a witness
and crafted a disposition based solely on the evidence the court adduced independently); CT v.
State (In re CT), 140 P.3d 643, 648 (Wyo. 2006) (reversing and remanding for abuse of discretion
where trial court failed to state the reasons for its departure from statute in issuing indefinite
probation beyond the maximum term of one year found in statute).
364. See, e.g., Oldfather & O'Hear, supra note 23, at 339.
365. 2010 DOJ REPORT, supra note 53, at 3.
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that other portions of the request were unknown to the administrative
office of the courts, such as the number of cases that resulted in adjudi-
cations of a juvenile's guilt or the number of youth ordered into
confinement.366
The data collected and reported by Washington State can serve as a
model starting point for other states seeking to better analyze their juve-
nile court systems. The Administrative Office of the Courts in Washing-
ton records and makes publicly available many categories of case
information. This includes the type of offenses that are the basis of com-
plaints, the number of cases that are adjudicated by trial, the number of
pleas entered, and dismissals at trial.36 7 It also includes the outcomes of
juvenile adjudications at disposition, including the number of juveniles
ordered into confinement. 368 While information about the appellate data
required a special inquiry, the state was able to retrieve that data through
its statistical reporting system. Other states, even some that reported, did
not have that data available in a centralized way and required more labo-
rious methods to access it.3 69
B. Assessment of the Right to Appeal
States should reassess their ability to provide access to appellate
review to juveniles. This would signify recognition of the institutional
role of appellate courts to provide protection against error, allow for law
development, and ensure uniformity in the application of the law. Each
of the appellate functions benefits the larger community in addition to
ensuring that the rights of its youngest members are protected. With only
five out of 1000 cases with findings of guilt are appealed, it is difficult
to maintain that minors are protected from error. Furthermore, even in
the adult criminal system where the appellate process appears more
robust, recent findings of innocence among those convicted have
resulted in calls for reform.o
366. E-mail from Robert Peake, Bureau Chief, Mont. Office of the Court Adm'r, to author
(Jan. 3, 2012) (on file with author) (stating that the Supreme Court system, the state's only
appellate court, does not separately record the number of juvenile delinquency appeals from other
civil appeals categories, making it difficult to report the number of appeals); E-mail from Kim
Nieves, Dir. of Research & Statistics, Admin. Office of the Pa. Courts, to author (Dec. 27, 2011)
(describing that the state caseload data record whether a hearing took place before a judge but not
the outcome of the case); E-mail from Monica Horn, Office of the State Court Adm'r, Or. Judicial
Dept., to author (Aug. 26, 2011) (providing data for the number of appeals and delinquency filings
but indicating the limitations in data collection tracking outcomes of cases and number juveniles
ordered into confinement by the court).
367. See generally Superior Court Year-to-Date Caseload Reports, WASH. COURTS, http://
www.courts.wa.gov/caseload/?fa=caseload.showIndex&level=freq=y (last updated Mar. 6, 2012).
368. Id.
369. See, e.g., E-mail from State of Ohio to author (2011) (on file with author).
370. Findley, supra note 56, at 591, 593-601.
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Courts have required states to afford juveniles with counsel on
appeal. 7 It is unknown to what extent current resource levels and deliv-
ery structures affect the low rates of appeals taken.372 The ABA and the
National Juvenile Defender Center have concluded that lack of resources
contributes to this aspect of deficient appellate advocacy. 7 In Florida,
where appeals were filed at a rate higher than other reporting states in
this study, the Chief Assistant Public Defender of the Juvenile Division
in one active office stated, "If someone came to me and wanted to build
a model office to represent juveniles, I would say to them, if you have
ten dollars, put nine of them into having a good system of appellate
review."3 74 She explained her belief that it is nearly impossible to pro-
tect the rights of juveniles without keeping an active appellate prac-
tice. 7 States should examine the right to appeal within their
jurisdictions and the suggested reasons for lack of appeals, including,
but not limited to, insufficient resources, lack of safeguards ensuring
valid waivers of counsel, the belief that "less is at stake" for juveniles,
length of time to resolution, and confusion among lawyers and courts
about the proper role of an attorney defending a child accused of a
crime. In addition, states should assess to what extent juveniles are
aware of their right to appeal. In some instances, it may be appropriate
to have the court inform the juvenile of the right to appeal in a language
that the juvenile understands.3 7 6
The presence and effects of these factors may vary according to
geography, even within a specific state. For example, implementation of
the right to counsel for juveniles across the country, which plays a criti-
cal role in the right to appeal, "is at best uneven and at worst unethi-
cal."37 Potential causes or correlations with the lack of appeals are
common and should be targeted more effectively. In states where appel-
late practice remains weak despite strong protections against waiver of
counsel by juveniles, such as in New Jersey and Texas as identified by
this study, other causes for weak appellate advocacy must be explored.
371. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
372. "Indigent defense representation is typically provided through some combination of three
methods: a public defender office, an assigned counsel system, and a contract system." LYNN
LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf.
373. 1995 ABA REPORT, supra note 10 at 11-12.
374. Interview with Marie Osborne, Chief Assistant Pub. Defender, Miami-Dade Juvenile Div.
(Nov. 9, 2011).
375. Id.
376. See LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY, supra note 80, at iv-v (suggesting that
Pennsylvania implement a requirement that the court inform juveniles of the right to appeal).
377. Puritz & Sterling, supra note 187, at 16.
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This could include the average caseload of the defenders and whether
the structure for appeals is under-resourced. Where caseloads exceed
suggested maximums, states should add resources to comply with
caseload recommendations by the ABA. 3 7 8 They should also consider
the benefits of including training to complement added resources. Train-
ing should target role confusion among attorneys and the bench so that
the duty to perform zealous advocacy is clear. At times, it appears that
judicial expectations of expediency contribute to the blurred defender
role which then deters appeals.
As states study the reasons for the lack of juvenile appeals, they
should pay careful attention to the groups of persons it most frequently
affects or leaves most vulnerable, such as members of minority groups
and indigent juveniles. Structural differences in how public defense is
provided within states or counties should also be studied against rates of
appeal across states. Whether the rates of appeal differ based upon the
assignment of counsel versus the ability to pay for private counsel or
vary geographically within a given state could help determine allocation
of resources or need for training. State efforts to reduce disproportionate
minority contact and confinement within the juvenile justice system
have had limited success. States continue to implement action plans to
reduce these disparities and report them as required under the JJDPA
without effective results.37 9 Attention to the appellate process is neces-
sary if states are serious about reducing disparities in minority confine-
ment rates. Appellate attention will crystallize and highlight problems
that occur at the outset of the juvenile delinquency process up through
the confinement stage. It can also reduce the dangers associated with
discretion that is left without any kind of review.
This principle is demonstrated in the context of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights and at sentencing. First, minority youth are arrested
at higher rates,so leaving them more likely to encounter Fourth and
378. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 9, at 5
n. 19. Only approximately eleven states (Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have adopted
caseload standards. See LANGTON & FAROLE, JR., supra note 372, at Table 7-a. New York State
also authorized New York City to adopt the case-cap limits equivalent to the ABA-endorsed
model in 2009 through a provision in the state budget. See John Eligon, State Law to Cap Public
Defenders' Caseloads, But Only in the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/04/06/nyregion/06defenders.html.
379. "While well-intentioned, this vague requirement has left federal, state, and local officials
without clear guidance on how to effectively reduce racial and ethnic disparities." Tara Andrews,
The Case for Reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act, THE
CHAMPION, July-Aug. 2001, at 57, 58 (2011). See also supra notes 259-261 and accompanying
text for a discussion of questions raised about the effectiveness of the JJDPA to reduce DMC
among juveniles.
380. See ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 273, at 4.
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Fifth Amendment issues as a result of the police encounters. These same
youth are then placed at risk in trial courts that, with little appellate
guidance, are less likely to address potential wrongdoing by police.3 1' In
the Fifth Amendment context, guarding against potential errors is partic-
ularly critical for confessions in interrogations and pleas by juveniles.3 82
Juveniles are at a higher risk of giving false confessions than adults, a
risk that increases the younger the children are. The Supreme Court's
recent decisions acknowledging the differences in juvenile development
have created a pivotal moment in the development of juvenile law.384
This is particularly true in light of the knowledge about the vulnerability
of youth and the risk of false confessions in coercive circumstances. A
study of falsely convicted youth found that 31% of exonerated youth
that were previously convicted had falsely confessed to the crime,
mostly due to police inducement.3 " The number increased to nearly half
when isolating younger juveniles ages eleven to fourteen, 6 the age of
the juvenile in J.D.B.
Healthy appellate review should be one guaranteed safeguard that
can partially protect against false confessions. Increased appellate
review of juvenile cases would provide courts with the opportunity to
discuss admissibility of statements and provide analysis about what kind
of police conduct results in coercion, potentially preventing future
harms. Case law explaining the boundaries of permissible questioning
and encounters between juveniles and police would then provide a
resource for future trial courts encountering suppression motions.
Relevant to these criminal procedural questions, the virtual exclu-
sion of the juvenile justice system from the appellate process raises com-
pelling questions about whether a large segment of juvenile law is
uniquely isolated from additional protections under state constitutional
provisions. State courts have frequently interpreted their state constitu-
tional rights provisions to provide more protection than the minimum
required under the U.S. Constitution. 8 Commentators predict the re-
381. See Amsterdam, supra note 341 and accompanying text (arguing that the court will be
less likely to determine police behavior was unreasonable without clear rules providing guidance).
382. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1059
(2010) ("An understanding of the vulnerability of confessions to contamination can also inform
courts reviewing trials post-conviction, particularly in cases involving persons vulnerable to
suggestion, such as juveniles and mentally disabled individuals whose false confessions are [the
subject of the article].").
383. See Tepfer, Nirider & Tricarico, supra note 10, at 893, 904.
384. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the recent
trilogy: Roper, Graham, and J.D.B.).
385. Id. at 904-05.
386. Id. at 905.
387. WILLUAMS, supra note 27, at 114; see, e.g., Robert J. Cody, Criminal Procedure and the
Massachusetts Constitution, 45 NEw ENG. L. REv. 815, 820 (2011). Since its first decision
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emergence of "New Judicial Federalism" with the current Roberts
Supreme Court issuing closely divided opinions on the meaning and
application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 8" Given that
criminal procedural law is a driving force in that arena,38 it is a question
deserving more attention.
Finally, unchallenged judicial decisions and the risk of abuse of
discretion more often affect minority youth because they face more
severe punishments. 390 Decisions to confine youth are rarely chal-
lenged.3 9 1 While it is true that judges are granted broad discretion, that
discretion is not designed to be unfettered. Increased advocacy and
attention to the articulation of reasons and bases for confinement in all
cases could reduce unnecessary instances of confinement. This is partic-
ularly important at a time when states are faced with prison overcrowd-
ing issues.
C. Policy Considerations
At the state and federal levels, the current unsatisfactory systems of
appellate review bring into question the fairness and wisdom of consid-
ering juvenile adjudications into adulthood. This includes the use of
juvenile adjudications as criminal convictions for predicate offenses and
sentencing enhancements, the sex offender registration requirement, and
the requirement to submit genetic material for DNA databases. The
attachment of measures that endure beyond childhood to adjudications
should, at the very least, be accompanied by the same commitments to
accuracy and reliability that accompany criminal convictions. When
considering or reconsidering such provisions, legislators should take into
account how the lack of appeals impacts the accuracy of decisions
reached in juvenile cases. Additionally, legislators should consider and
address an important, seemingly conflicting reality, whereby juvenile
adjudications tend to be considered the equivalent of convictions for
affording expanded protections, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "has never looked
back, and the distance between the rights and protections of persons from unreasonable searches
and seizures under Article 14 [of the Massachusetts Constitution] and the Fourth Amendment has
grown." Id. at 820; see also State v. Schwartz, 136 P.3d 989, 990 (Mont. 2006) ("Unlike its
federal counterpart, however, Montana's constitutional scheme affords citizens broader protection
of their right to privacy. See Article 11, Section 10. In Montana, therefore, we analyze search and
seizure issues in light of our citizens' enhanced right to privacy.").
388. See Cody, supra note 387, at 816, 832.
389. See WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 125.
390. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
391. See supra Part IV.B.3 (describing the lack of appellate opinions discussing challenges to
juvenile dispositions); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing similar findings
by experts in Pennsylvania).
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purposes of sentencing enhancement3 92 and DNA registration,39 3 but,
quite often, not for post-conviction relief.3 9 4
Courts and scholars disagree about the role a jury should play in
ensuring the accuracy of previous adjudications used for sentencing
enhancements. But even beyond that question, the reliability of juvenile
adjudications should be questioned based upon the failure to demon-
strate the presence of any consistent safeguards. This may include the
failure to provide enough resources so that juveniles have access to
counsel from trial through a first right of appeal. As the Supreme Court
stated in Gault, "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."3 95
Based upon the appellate data, legislators and judges should not
automatically assume, and, indeed, should seriously question, the legiti-
macy of the appellate court process. The data discussed here raises seri-
ous questions about whether there are adequate guards against error.
This existing data shows that juveniles are not, in fact, provided access
to the appellate right contemplated by state statutes, and, in some cases,
state constitutions. Research suggests that juvenile bench trials are not
immune to this problem and may even be more likely to be reversed on
appeal based upon insufficiency.3 96 Analysis and research on the psy-
chology of judicial decision-making dispels the notion that bench trials
are inherently more reliable.3 97
When the current lack of appellate process is combined with the
procedural uniqueness of juvenile cases, it demonstrates an unparalleled
lack of transparency and accountability. Because this lack of appellate
review by the courts is accompanied by minimal access and participation
by the public, the situation is ripe, and almost crying out, for poor out-
comes. The data confirms the likelihood that one person alone decides
the facts, applies the law, and determines the disposition in the clear
majority of juvenile cases in the United States. This current reality runs
counter to the foundation of the justice system and to the assurances
contemplated for juveniles in Gault. Juvenile appellate practice and the
consequences of adjudications should be reexamined in light of the data.
392. See supra Part II.C.1.
393. See, e.g., People v. Lakisha M. (In re Lakisha M.), 882 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ill. 2008).
394. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.13(a) (West 2011) (except for purposes of penalty
enhancement in subsequent felonies, "an order of adjudication or disposition . . . is not a
conviction of crime"); Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408-09 (Ind. 1987) (holding that
"Uluvenile adjudications do not constitute criminal convictions," and, therefore, post-conviction
remedies cannot be interpreted to apply to a juvenile delinquency cases).
395. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
396. See supra Part II.A.




Moving toward a vibrant appellate practice is essential to ensure a
just system for juveniles. It would both improve the development of
legal doctrine and ensure better protection against the errors that result
due to the greater vulnerabilities of young people in the justice system. It
would also contribute to a uniform treatment of all youth so that the
most vulnerable populations are no longer treated more harshly than
their peers. More data collection and targeted interventions could help
states breathe new life into the constitutional and procedural rights of
juveniles, chief among them, the seemingly elusive right to an appeal.
Waiver of rights, lack of transparency, and inconsistent protections of
the right to effective counsel create a perfect storm for harm to juveniles
in the face of few appeals. With an increase in lifelong consequences of
juvenile adjudications-often unknown to players in the system-it is
vital to ensure appropriate review. The justice system is designed to pro-
tect against and avoid situations where one person has full discretion and
decision-making power. States should make a concerted effort to remove
the current barriers to access to appeals and, at the very least, reexamine
polices attaching lengthy consequences to juvenile adjudications. Most
importantly, in a time where recent Supreme Court decisions "herald" a
new age of juvenile justice,39 8 the justice system must be poised and
prepared to usher in this new age and define what these new develop-
ments will mean going forward.
* **
398. See generally Levick, supra note 21.
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